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C HAP T E R 21 
Environmental Law 
JEFFREY G. MILLER 
§21.1. Introduction. During the 1972 SURVEY year, a number of 
developments, state and federal, legislative and administrative, altered 
significantly the thrust of Massachusetts efforts in environmental pro-
tection. One major development was the promulgation of administrative 
regulations which finalize most of the details of the Massachusetts plan 
to implement the provisions of the Federal Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1970.1 The Clean Air Act provides for general federal supervision 
of the manner in which states fulfill their pollution control responsibilities. 
The procedural steps by which the Massachusetts implementation plan 
was developed and the various facets of the plan itself are discussed in 
Part A of this chapter. 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 19722 pro-
vide for similar federal supervision of state water pollution control pro-
grams. Although the details of the Massachusetts response to this federal 
enactment have yet to be finalized, some of the major provisions of the 
1972 Amendments are highlighted in Part B. 
In addition, a number of Massachusetts statutes enacted during the 
1972 SURVEY year dealt with environmental considerations. The most 
significant of these was Chapter 781 of the Acts of 1972 which requires 
that the environmental impact of all projects proposed by state agencies 
be fully examined and all practicable measures be taken to prevent 
damage to the environment. Chapter 781 is discussed in Part C. 
Other 1972 Massachusetts enactments amended statutes which grant 
tax incentives for industrial air and water pollution control facilities, 
afford protection of wetlands, floodplains and marine resources and 
create a private right of action. These statutory changes are discussed 
in Part D. 
A. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL 
§21.2. The Massachusetts implementation plan: Introduction and 
background. Through a series of enactments collectively known as the 
JEFFREY G. MILLER is a member of the Massachusetts Bar. 
Mr. Miller wrote §§21.2-21.6. 
§21.1. 1 42 U.S.C. §§1857-18571 (1970). 
2 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972), to be codified at 33 U.S.C. §1151 
et seq. 
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Clean Air Act,l Congress has developed a plan by which the states may 
institute their own programs to control air pollution within their bound-
aries while keeping within the framework of a general federal plan. 
While the Act declares a Congressional policy of leaving the responsibility 
for the achievement and maintenance of air quality to the states,2 it also 
reveals an intent to develop a viable national control strategy through 
the provisions authorizing federal intervention should states fail to im-
plement or enforce minimum federal standards.3 The wrinkles of "new 
federalism" inherent in these provisions are sometimes surprising, often 
confusing, and invariably complex. The following sections will explore 
the scope and enforceability of the Massachusetts statutes and regulations 
which implement the Act's provisions for the oontrol of air pollution. 
Under the provisions of the Clean Air Act, several phases of state-
federal interaction must precede final adoption of state implementation 
plans: (1) federal designation of air quality control regions;4 (2) federal 
listing of air pollutants for which completed air quality criteria and 
standards must be issued;5 (3) federal publication of national primary 
and secondary ambient air quality standards6 for each air pollutant for 
§21.2. 1 42 U.S.C. §§1857 to 18571 (1970). Federal air pollution legislation 
dates to the research-oriented 1955 Air Pollution Control Research and Techni-
ca1' Assistance Act, 6 Stat. 322, and a 1960 provision for a study of motor 
vehicle exhausts, 74 Stat. 162. These were followed by the more comprehensive 
Clean Air Act of 1963, 77 Stat. 392, which incorporated some of the provisions 
of the Act as it exists today. The 1963 enactment was amended to its present 
form by the Clean Air Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 992; the Air Quality Act of 1967, 
81 Stat. 485; and the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 1676. 
Responsibility for air pollution at the federal level was originally vested in 
the Surgeon General and later in the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. 
By virtue of Reorg. PI'an 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623 (1970), and the Clean 
Air Amendments of 1970, the federal air pollution control responsibilities were 
transferred from the Secretary to the Administrator of the newly-created En-
vironmental Protection Agency. 
2 See the congressional finding, dating back to the 1955 legislation, that "the 
prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary responsibility 
of States and local governments," but "Federal financial assistance and leadership 
is essential," 42 U.S.C. §1857(a) (3)-(4) (1970). See also 42 U.S.C. §1857c-2(a) 
(1970). However, the trend of federal legislation since the initial' 1955 Act has 
been toward increased federal responsibility at the expense of state autonomy. 
Compare the provisions of the successive federal legislation cited in note 1, supra. 
3 See 42 U.S.C. §1857c-5 (1970) and regulations promulgated thereunder, 40 
C.F.R. §§51.1 to 51.32 (1972). See also 42 U.S.C. §§1857c-5(c) and 1857c-8 
(1970) . 
4 42 U.S.C. §1857c-2(c) (1970). Some regions had been designated under 
previous authority. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2 (b) (1970). The six Massachusetts regions 
are listed in note 12, infra. 
542 U.S.C. §1857c-3(a)(1) (1970). 
6 "National primary ambient air quality standards . . . [are] ambient air 
quality standards the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of 
the [EPA], based on [air quality] criteria and allowing an adequate margin of 
safety, are requisite to protect the public health." 42 U.S.C. §1857c-4(b) (1) 
(1970). 
2
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which air quality criteria had been issued;' (4) state preparation of an 
implementation plan designed to achieve and maintain the federal air 
quality standards;8 (5) federal approval of satisfactory portions of state 
plans;9 (6) federal publication of regulations which, if not subsequently 
incorporated by states, would supplant unsatisfactory aspects of state 
plans;10 and p) state and federal enforcement of approved state plans 
and federal enforcement of federally-substituted plans.11 
Within this administrative framework, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (the EPA)-the agency which is charged with the implementa-
tion of the Clean Air Act-has designated six air quality control regions, 
three interstate and three intrastate, within Massachusetts' jurisdiction.12 
Following the listing of a number of pollutants and the publication of 
air quality standards and criteria for these pollutants,13 the EPA promul-
"[N]ational secondary ambient air quality standard[s] ... specify a level of 
air quality the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the 
[EPA], based on [air quality] criteria, [are] requisite to protect the public 
welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence 
of such air pollutant in the ambient air." 42 U.S.C. §1857c-4(b) (2) (1970). 
, 42 U.S.C. §1857c-4 (1970). 
8 Id. § 1857c-5. 
9 Id. § 1857c-5 (a) (2). 
10 Id. § 1857c-5 (c). 
11 Id. § 1857c-8. 
12 35 Fed. Reg. 18978-79 (1970), republished 36 Fed. Reg. 4543-5 (1971), 
now found at 40 C.F.R. §81.12 to 81.267 (1972). The regions subject to Massa-
chusetts jurisdiction are: \ 1) the Metropolitan Boston Intrastate Air Quality 
Control Region; (2) the Hartford-New Haven-Springfield Interstate Air Quality 
Control Region; (3) the Metropolitan Providence Interstate Air Quality Control 
Region; (4) the Merrimac Valley-Southern New Hampshire Interstate Air Quality 
Control Region; (5) the Berkshire Intrastate Air Quality Control Region; and 
(6) the Central Massachusetts Intrastate Air Quality Control Region, listed 
respectively in 40 C.F.R. at §§81.19, .26, .31, .81, .141, and .142 (1972). 
The EPA also designated two new Massachusetts regions (Berkshire and Central 
Massachusetts) and revised the designations of three existing Massachusetts re-
gions (Providence, Boston, and Hartford-New Haven-Springfield). These three 
existing regions had been created previously by the Public Health Service of the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare pursuant to earlier sections of the 
Act: the Providence region, 34 Fed. Reg. 11552 (1969), republished 34 Fed. 
Reg. 19354 (1969); the Boston region, 33 Fed. Reg, 19198 (1968), republished 
34 Fed, Reg. 6436 (1969); the Hartford-New Haven-Springfield region, 34 Fed. 
Reg. 6539 (1969), republished 34 Fed. Reg. 15415 (1969). 
The earlier promulgation made no mention of the Merrimack Valley-Southern 
New Hampshire region also designated previously by the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare, 35 Fed. Reg. 11475 (1970), republished 35 Fed. Reg. 
15643 (1970). 
13 Prior to December 31, 1970, the EPA had on two occasions issued air quality 
criteria for five poll'utants: (1) 34 Fed. Reg. 1988 (1969) (for particulate matter 
and sulfur oxides); and (2) 35 Fed. Reg. 4768 (1970) (for carbon monoxide, 
photochemical oxidants, and hydrocarbons). Section 109 of the Act required that 
by January 30, 1971, the EPA publish proposed national primary and secondary 
ambient air quality standards for each pollutant for which air quality criteria 
3
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gated procedural and substantive regula:tions outlining the requirements 
for preparation, adoption and submission of state implementation plans,14 
In January of 1972 the department adopted the Massachusetts imple-
mentation plan and submitted it,15 together with two specific time 
extension requests, for EPA approvaP6 The EPA approved the plan, 
with three exceptions,!' and granted the two requested extensions in 
May 1972.l8 Shortly thereafter the EPA published proposed regulations 
had been issued prior to the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1970 (December 31, 1970). Accordingly, on January 30, 1971, the EPA issued 
proposed primary and secondary air quality standards for the five previously-
identified pollutants, 36 Fed. Reg. 1502-14 (1971). At the same time the EPA 
al>SO listed a sixth air pollutant, nitrogen oxides, and, pursuant to Section 109, 
issued air quality criteria as well as proposed primary and secondary air quality 
standards for that substance, 36 Fed. Reg. 1515 (1971). An additional sulfur 
oxide secondary standard was proposed on March 30, 1971. 36 Fed. Reg. 5867 
(1971.) All the standards for the six substances were republished and finalized. 
36 Fed. Reg. 8186 (1971). 
See also 42 U.S.C. §1857c-4 (1970) and 36 Fed. Reg. 22384 (1971), now 
found at 40 C.F.R. §§50.1 to 50.11 (1972). The various standards are discussed 
below. 
14 42 U.S.C. §§1857c-5(a) (2) (B) to (H) (1970).36 Fed. Reg. 15486 (1971), 
now found at 40 C.F.R. §§51.1 to 51.22 (1972). 
15 37 Fed. Reg. 10872 (1972), inserting 40 C.F.R. §51.l120(b) (1972). 
16 The first request was for an eighteen-month extension of time for develop-
ing a plan to attain and maintain the secondary standards for particulate matter 
and sulfur oxides in the Metropolitan Boston Region. The extension was granted 
under the authority of 42 U.S.C. §1857c-5(b) (1970); see also 40 C.F.R. §51.31 
(1972). The second request was for an extension of time to devise a plan to 
achieve primary and secondary carbon monoxide standards in the Massachusetts 
portion of the Hartford-New Haven-Springfield region. This extension was 
granted under the authority of 42 U.S.C. §1857c-5(b) and (e) (1970); see also 
40 C.F.R. §§51.30, .31 (1972). 
17 37 Fed. Reg. 10842-46, 10872 (1972), inserting 40 C.F.R. §§51.1120 to 
.1128 (1972). The exceptions related to (1) the control strategy for nitrogen 
dioxide <in the Massachusetts portion of the Hartford-New Haven-Springfield re-
gion; (2) the failure to require compliance schedules for meeting certain regula-
tions; and (3) the failure to provide for enforceable procedures to prevent 
construction of new sources or the modification of existing sources which would 
violate the implementation plan, 37 Fed. Reg. 10872 (1972), inserting 40 C.F.R. 
§§51.1124 to .1126 (1972). Compliance schedules are required by 42 U.S.C. 
§1857c-5(a) (2) (B) (1970) and 40 C.F.R. §51.15(a) (2) (1972). Enforceable 
procedures are required in connection with the construction of new sources and 
the modification of existing sources by 42 U.S.C. §§1857c-5(a) (2) (D) and (4) 
(1970), and 40 C.F.R. §51.18(c) (1972). 
1837 Fed. Reg. 10872 (1972), inserting 40 C.F.R. §51.1128 (1972). Con-
currently with the grant of the two extensions, the EPA allowed the department 
until February 15, 1973 to formulate, and until December 30, 1974 to implement, 
transportation controls to achieve and maintain the primary and secondary 
standards for carbon monoxide and photochemical oxidants in the Metropolitan 
Boston region. Such standards are required by 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (a) (2)(B) 
(1970) and 40 C.F.R. §§51.11(b) and .14 (1972). 
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to correct the three deficiencies in the Massachusetts plan.19 Thereupon 
the department submitted revisions intended to correct two of the de-
ficiencies ;20 the EPA approved the revisions and indicated that it would 
hold in abeyance the promulgation of final regulations regarding the 
third stated deficiency.21* Once approved, the substantive provisions of 
the Massachusetts air pollution control implementation plan became 
enforceable both by the EPA and by the state.22 Additionally the plan's 
19 37 Fed. Reg. 11826, 11834-35 (1972), inserting 40 C.F.R. §§52.1124 to 
.1126 (1972). 
20 37 Fed. Reg. 23085-86, 23088 (1972), revising 40 C.F.R. §52.1120(c) (3) 
(1972). 
21 37 Fed. Reg. 23086 and 23088 (1972). 
*In Natural Resources Defense CouncH v. Environmental Protection Agency, 
Cases No. 72-1219 and 72-1224 (lst. Cir.), a decision rendered as this article 
was going to press, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the EPA's ap-
proval of the Massachusetts implementation plan was defective in a number of 
respects. Acting under its original jurisdiction in reviewing the approval of im-
plementation plans (42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5 (b) (1)), the Court ordered the EPA to 
disapprove the variance and source reporting procedures in the Massachusetts 
plan. It held that, apart from brief postponements of a few weeks or months 
necessitated by mechanical breakdowns or acts of god, variances could not be 
granted after the mandatory deadline for the attainment of air quality standards. 
That deadline for primary standards is July 1975 or, where a two-year extension 
has been granted, July 1977. After that attainment date has passed, an imple-
mentation plan may be changed only upon the request of the governor of a state 
and the finding by the EPA that: ( 1) good faith efforts have been made to 
comply prior to the attainment date; (2) compliance is impossible because 
necessary technology is not avaHable; (3) interim control measures will reduce 
the impact of the source on public health; and (4) the continued operation of 
the source is essential to national security or public health or welfare. 42 U.S.C. 
§1857c-5(f). These stringent tests make it unlikely that many variances will be 
granted after the air quality standards attainment dates have passed. In the 
meantime, variances may not be granted before such date without EPA approval. 
The court found that the Massachusetts source reporting requirements were de-
fective insofar as they did not require periodic reporting but only upon the dis-
cretionary request of the Department of Public Health. It also found that the 
Commonwealth's l'egal authority might be insufficient to require public disclosure 
of all source emission data. It ordered the EPA to disapprove the Massachusetts 
plan in all of these respects and to promulgate regulations to correct the de-
ficiencies. 
22 42 U.S.C. §1857c-8 (1970). It should be noted, however, that other parts 
of the plan have been and may be affected by rulings in two cases. The first, 
Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253, 4 E.R.C. 1205 (D.D.C. 1972), 
afJ'd 4 E.R.C. 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), required disapproval of those parts of 
state implementation plans which may allow future pollution, however slight, 
of areas that are presently pollution-free. Accordingly, on November 9 1972 
the EPA disapproved all' state plans insofar as they did not guarantee the p~llution~ 
free future of unpolluted areas. 37 Fed. Reg. 23836 (1972), inserting 40 C.F.R. 
§52.21 (1972). The second case, Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (lst Cir., No. 72-1224), has challenged EPA approval 
of all state implementation plans, including that of Massachusetts, due to the 
EPA's allegedly unwarranted granting of a time extension for the submission of 
transportation controls designed to reduce the pollution generated by vehicular 
traffic. 
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provisions became enforceable by private citizens under the citizen suit 
provision of the Clean Air Act, sUlbject to various procedural require-
ments enabling state and federal authorities to take prior action.23 
Similar enforcement power is also afforded private citizens under state 
law.24 
Prior to the 1970 revisions to Clean Air Act, a number of Massachu-
setts statutes conferred upon the Department of Public Health jurisdiction 
over air pollution control. G.L., c. 111, §§142A-E empower the depart-
ment to undertake such regulatory funcJtions as are necessary to control 
air pollution in the Commonwealth. G.L., c. 111, §142D, added in 1969, 
specifioally authorizes the department to implement the provisions of 
the 1970 Clean Air Act.25 Of the wealth of maJterial submitted by the 
Commonwealth to the EPA, the regulations promulgated by the depart-
ment are most relevant for pU11poses of this discussion of the Massachu-
setts implementation plan. Under the plan submitted for approval, 
separate regulations were adopted for each of the six regions designated 
by the EPA.26 Although the structure of the regulations is identical for 
each region, the individual provisions vary substantively from region to 
region due to the differing ,air pollution problems peculiar to each region. 
Three categories of regulations will be considered in the following sec-
tions: (1) regulations of general applicability; (2) regulations pertain-
ing to each of the six pollutants for which primary and secondary ambient 
air quality standards have been promulgated; and (3) regulations govern-
ing other types of air contaminants. 
§21.3. Regulations of general applicability. The general thrust of 
the department's regulations is to abate present sources of air pollution 
and to prevent the creation of additional air pollution sources. Regula-
tion 1 imposes an overall prohibition upon the operation of any emission 
source, alone or in conjunction with other sources, in a manner which 
will cause a condition of air pollution.1 As a condition precedent to con-
23 42 U.S.C. §1857h-2 (1970). 
24 G.L., c. 214, §lOA. 
25 Not all Massachusetts statutes and regulations controlling air pollution im-
plement the Clean Air Act. Some of those that do not are treated in §21.5, infra. 
Some of the statutes and regulations that do impl'ement the Act were already 
in existence, in either their present or similar forms, prior to the administrative 
interplay triggered by the Act. In addition, not all of the provisions of the Act 
contemplate implementation through state action; some of these exclusively 
federal aspects of the Act are set forth in §21.5, infra. 
26 "Regulations for the Control of Pollution in the Berkshire (Central Massa-
chusetts, Merrimack, Metropol'itan Boston, Pioneer Valley and Southeastern 
Massachusetts) Air Pollution Control District[s]," adopted by the department 
on January 26, 1972, were filed with the Secretary of State on April 24, 1972 
and made effective as of June 1, 1972. These regulations supplanted less extensive 
regulations previously in effect. 
§21.3. 1 "Air pollution," as defined in Regulations, Definition 5, encompasses 
conditions which (1) cause a nuisance; (2) may injure persons, animals, vegeta-
tion or property; or (3) unreasonably interfere with the comfortable enjoyment 
of life or property or the conduct of business. 
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tinued operation, certain major pollution sources must be registered an-
nually with the department under the provisions of Regulation 12.2 
Regulation 2 strictly limits the construction or modification of emission 
sources. Specifically, no building permit may be issued for the construc-
tion or modification of an emission source unless the source has been 
registered under the provisions of Regulation 12,3 nor may the construc-
tion or modification of the source proceed unless operational details have 
been approved by the department.4 Regulation 6 sets maximum smoke 
density and smoke emission rates for staJtionary sources.5 
§21.4. The six specifically regulated pollutants. As a prelude to 
a discussion of the Massachusetts regulations governing the six air 
pollutants for which the EPA has promulgated naJt:ional primary and 
secondary ambient air quality standards-namely, sulfur oxides (802 ), 
particulate matter, nitrogen oxides (NOx), hydrocarbons (HC), carbon 
monoxide (CO), and photochemical oxidants (commonly known as 
"smog")-it is appropriate to interjeot some background information 
relating to those pollutants. In terms of volume and severity of effects, 
these six pollutants have been identified as the major air contaminants. 
Table 1 lists the source and quality of emissions for five of the six 
pollutants. 
2 Regulation 12.1. Sources covered by this regulation i.nclude: ( 1) fossil fuel 
utilization facilities having a heat input capacity in excess of 3 million BTU per 
hour (the size required ror small manufacturing establishments, hospitals and 
very l'arge apartment complexes), Regulation 12.2.1; (2) incinerators having the 
capacity of reducing in excess of 1,000 pounds of waste per hour (the size 
required by larger commercial, industrial or municipal establishments), Regula-
tion 12.4.1; and (3) a variety of specified industrial sources (see Regulation 
12.3.2) emitting specified amounts of particular pollutants (see Regulations 
12.3.1 and 12.1). 
3 Regulation 12.1. 
4 Regulation 2.1. Department disapproval, of course, could only be based on 
factors which might result in a condition of ,air pollution. Regulation 2.2. Since 
no enforcement mechanism was originally provided to prevent construction or 
modification of such sources, as required by 42 U.S.C. §1857c-(a) (2) (D) (1970), 
this portion of the implementation plan was disapproved, 37 Fed. Reg. 10872 
(1972), inserting 40 C.F.R. §52.1126 (1972). See also 40 C.F.R. §51.18 (1972). 
The deficiency was corrected by amendments to the department's regulations 
(Regulations 2.1.1 to 2.1.4, effective September 1, 1972) and this portion of the 
plan was subsequently approved, 37 Fed. Reg. 23088 (1972), revoking 40 C.F.R. 
§52.1126 (1972), promulgated 37 Fed. Reg. 11834 (1972); see §21.2., notes 
17 -19 and accompanying text, supra. 
5 Visible emissions from incinerators are dealt with in Regulation 6.2. Stationary 
sources other than incinerators may not emit smoke with a density greater than 
No. 1 on the Ringleman Chart (see Regulations, Definition 8) (approximately 
20% opacity) for periods aggregating more than six minutes in any hour or 
with a density greater than No.2 on the Ringleman Chart (approximately 40% 
opacity) at any time, Regulation 6.1.1. Other sources, except incinerators, may 
not emit smoke of an opacity that could be controlled through availabl'e technology 
or operating procedures or, in any event, of an opacity greater than 20% for 
periods aggregating more than two minutes in any hour, Regulation 6.1.2. "Smoke," 
as defined in Regulations, Definition 38, does not include water vapor. 
7
Miller: Chapter 21: Environmental Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1972
§21.4 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 585 
Table 11 
Source S02 Particulates NOx HC CO 
(in millions of tons per annum) 
Transportation 0.8 1.2 8.1 16.6 63.8 
Fuel Combustion 24.7 8.9 10.0 0.7 1.9 
Industrial Process 7.3 7.5 0.2 4.6 9.7 
Solid Waste Disposal 0.1 1.1 0.6 1.6 7.8 
Miscellaneous 0.6 9.6 1.7 8.5 16.9 
The sixth pollutant, photochemical oxidants or smog, is not listed on 
Table 1 because it has not been technologically possible to establish the 
quantity of this pollutant. Smog is not emitted directly but is produced 
in the atmosphere by the chemical reaction of two other pollutants, 
nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons, in the presence of sunlight. Conse-
quently, any strategy to control smog must necessarily be aimed at re-
ducing these two pollutants. 
The table illustrates that transportation sources produce nearly one-
half of the hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide emissions. Strategies to 
reduce these pollutants, as well as smog, must therefore focus upon 
motor vehicle emission controls. Control over aircraft and new motor 
vehicle emissions is not within the ambit of sta:te enforcement since 
such state jurisdiction is largely pre-empted by Title II of the Clean 
Air Act.2 The states do, however, retain jurisdiction over the control 
of emissions from motor vehicles manufactured in prior years and even 
over aircraft (in the latter case, only to the extent that such control is 
not more demanding than the federal control). 
Strategies to reduce the quantity of anyone pollutant often have 
an effect extending beyond the control of that pollutant inasmuch as 
emissions of other pollutants will be simultaneously reduced. For ex-
ample, in the greater Boston area, the use of low-sulfur fuel to reduce 
sulfur dioxide emissions has resulted in a reduction of particula:te matter 
emissions since the low-sulfur fuel has a lower ash content than the 
high-sulfur fuel previously used. The regulations which are discussed 
below as control measures for particular pollutants can therefore be 
expected to control emissions of other pollutants as well. The extent of 
this collateral effect is illustrated in Table 2. 
§21.4. 1 HOFFMAN, NATIONAL INVENTORY OF AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS, 
1968. Environmental Protection Agency, 1970, A.P. Document -73, at 3. Nitrogen 
1968. EnviTonmental Protection Agency, 1970, A.P. Document 73, at 3. Nitrogen 
oxides are measured by the quantity of nitrogen dioxide (N02) emissions, sulphur 
oxides by the quantity of sulphur dioxide (S02) emissions. 
2 42 u.s.c. §§1857f-6(a) and 1857f-11 (1970). See also 40 C.F.R. §§85.1 to 
85.327 (1972). 
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Table 23 
Regulation S02 Particulates NOx 
1. General + + + 
HC 
+ 
2. Plan Approval and 
Emission Limitations + + + + 
3. Nuclear 0 0 0 0 
4. Fossil Fuel Facilities + + + + 
5. Sulfur Content of Fuel + + 0 0 
6. Visable Emissions 0 + + + 
7. Open Burning + + + + 
8. Incinerators + + + + 
9. Dust and Odor 0 0 0 + 
10. Noise 0 + 0 0 
11. Transportation 0 + + + 
+ Reduces emissions 0 No effect on emissions 
CO 
+ 
+ 
o 
+ 
o 
o 
+ 
+ 
o 
o 
+ 
§21.4 
Other 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
o 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Sulfur oxide regulations. Each state implementation plan must demon-
strate that the application of statutes and regulaltions contained in the 
plan will achieve the primary! and secondary standards5 for sulfur oxides 
in each air quality control region within the time period specified in the 
Act.6 Four separate regulations promulgated by the department deal 
3 "Regulations---Contaminant Relations" from 111-22 of the Massachusetts 
implementation plan. 
4 The primary standards for sulfur oxides are: (1) an annual arithmetic mean 
of 80 micrograms per cubic meter (0.03 parts per mil'lion), and (2) a maximum 
24-hour concentration, not to be exceeded more than once per year, of 365 
micrograms per cubic meter (0.14 parts per million). 40 a.F.R. §50.4 (1972). 
These concentrations and others incorporated in the primary and secondary 
standards are to be measured at 25°a and 760 millimeters of mercury pressure. 
40 a.F.R. §50.3 (1972). Tests for sulfur dioxide are to be made by the reference 
method described in 40 a.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A, or equivalent method. 
5 The secondary standards for sulfur oxides are: (1) an annual arithmetic 
mean of 60 micrograms per cubic meter (0.02 parts per million), (2) a maximum 
24-hour concentration, not to be exceeded more than once per year, of 260 
micrograms per cubic meter (0.1 parts per million) and (3) a maximum 3-hour 
concentration, not be exceeded more than once a year, of 1,300 micrograms per 
cubic meter (0.5 parts per million), 40 a.F.R. §50.5 (1972). Test methods are 
the same as for primary standards, note 1, supra. 
6 40 a.F.R. §51.13(a) (1972). The Act specified that the primary standards 
were to be attained "as expeditiously as practicable," but no later than three 
years after the approval' of the implementation plan by the EPA and that the 
secondary standards were to be achieved within a "reasonable time," 42 u.s.a. 
§1857c-5(a) (2) (A) (1970). A "reasonable time" is three years if the secondary 
standards can be met by the application of "reasonably available control tech-
nology," unless the state shows good cause for postponing the application of such 
technology, 40 a.F.R. §51.13(b) (1) (1972). Where the secondary standards 
cannot be met by applying such technology or where they can be met but the 
state shows good cause for postponing the application of that technology, the 
meaning of "reasonable time" is not defined. 40 a.F.R. §51.13(b) (2) (1972). 
Each state was required to make use of proportional or diffusional models or 
other appropriate procedures to demonstrate that its plan would meet the stan-
dards within the timetable specified in the Act, 40 a.F.R. §51.13 (e) (1) (1972). 
9
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directly with the sources of sulfur oxide emissions.7 First, Regulation 5 
limits the use of various types of fuel. The sulfur content of residual 
oil or coal burned in the core Metropolitan Boston region8 is limited to 
0.5%9 and that burned elsewhere in !the state to 1.0%.10 The sulfur con-
tent of No.2 fuel oil burned throughout the Commonwealth is limited 
to 0.3%.11 However, a source may burn fuel of a higher sulfur content 
if the department approves an alternate plan which will have an air 
pollution effect not exceeding that resulting from use of the fuel pre-
scribed by the Regulation.12 Residual fuel oil may not be burned at all 
in a fossil fuel utilization facility with an input capacity of three million 
or less BTU per hour,13 and may not be burned in the core Metropolitan 
Boston region after July 1, 1973 in such a facility with an hourly input 
capacity of six million or less BTU.14 No fuel with a sulfur content in 
excess of that prescribed for a particular region may be shipped to or 
within that region unless the department has approved the use of the 
fuel shipped.15 To faciHtate enforcement, sellers and distributors of fossil 
fuel to be burned within the Commonwealth must register with the de-
partment16 and keep detailed records of sulfur content for all fuel 
transactions,17 Secondly, Regulation 4 provides that certain fossil fuel 
utilization facilities may not be constructed or modified until the depart-
ment has approved plans and procedures18 and that no such facility, 
operated as a high-pressure system or otherwise designated by the de-
partment, may burn fossil fuel unless the facility is equipped with a 
smoke density sensing device of a type approved by the department and 
7 In submitting its implementation plan to the EPA for approval in the fourth 
phase, §21.3, note 5, supra, of the Act's administrative program, the department 
requested, and was granted, an extension for submitting its plan to meet the 
secondary sulfur oxide standards in the Metropolitan Boston region, see 37 Fed. Reg. 
10872, (1972) inserting 40 C.F.R. §52.1122(a) (1972). Such extension is au-
thorized by 42 U.S.C. §1857c-5(b) (1970). 
8 Arlington, Belmont, Boston, Brookline, Cambridge, Chelsea, Everett, Malden, 
Medford, Newton, Somerville, Waltham and Watertown, Regulation 5.1.1 for 
the Metropolitan Boston region. 
9 The limitation is actually expressed as 0.28 pounds of sulfur per million 
BTU heat release potential, the equivalent of 0.5% sulfur content, Regulation 
5.1.1 for the Metropolitan Boston region. 
10 The limitation is actually to 0.55 pounds of sulfur per million BTU heat 
release potential, the equivalent of 1 % sulfur content, Regulations 5.1.2 for all 
regions, including the Metropolitan Boston region except in those cities and towns 
specified in note 8, supra. 
11 The limitation is actually to 0.17 pounds of sulfur per million BTU heat 
release potential, the equivalent of 0.3% sulfur content, Regulation 5.1.3. 
12 Regulations 5.1.1(a) and (b), 5.1.2(a) and (b), and 5.1.3(a) and (b). 
13 Regulation 5.2.2. 
- 14 Regulation 5.2.2. for the Metropolitan Boston region. But see Regulation 
5.2.3 for that region. 
15 Regulation 5.1.4. 
16 Regulation 5.1.5. 
17 Regulations 5.1.4(c) and 5.6. 
18 Regulation 4.1. 
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maintained in a good state of repair.19 Thirdly, emissions of sulfur dioxide 
by industrial facilities and contact sulfuric acid plants are limited by 
Regulation 2.20 These sources must meet prescribed standards under the 
same compliance schedule established for particulate emissions, see §21.7, 
infra. Finally, Regulation 12 provides that industrial facilities21 emitting 
more than four pounds of sulfur dioxide hourly may not be operated 
unless registered with the department.22 
The status of ,the standards that have been established by the EPA 
with regard to sulfur oxides has not been fully resolved. In Kennecott 
Copper Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency,23 the national 
secondary standards were attacked under Section 307 of the Act24 on the 
grounds that they were arbitrarily imposed without adequate factual 
justification. The court of appeals found no indication of the basis upon 
which the EPA had established the secondary air quality standards for 
sulfur oxides and remanded the case to the EPA either for an indica-
tion of the basis upon which the standards were established or for a 
revision of the standards.25 The court specifically stated that the remand 
in the Kennecott case was not intended to "halt or delay the on-going 
proceedings for state adoption of implementation plans to meet and 
maintain the national standards."26 
It is apparent that the validity of state statutes and regulations enacted 
or promulgated to attain a federal standard may be suspect in the event 
the federal standard is subsequently declared invalid. In Associated In-
dustries of Massachusetts v. F.rechette,2' however, the superior court 
ruled that the department's authority to promulgate regulations is not 
limited to the attainment of federal primary and secondary standards, 
but inures from the broader power "to prevent pollution or undue con-
tamination of the atmosphere" under G.L., c. 111, §§142B and 142D. 
This ruling is also in accord with the Clean Air Act which expressly 
provides that, in most areas, the states merely have to meet the national 
standards as minimal standards and are free to enact regulations that 
19 Regulations 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. 
20 Industrial facilities, as described in 121.3., note 2, supra, may not emit 
more than 25 pounds of sulfur dioxide per hour. Contact sulfuric acid plants 
may not emit more than four pounds of sulfur dioxide per ton of production if 
new, or 27 pounds if existing. No such industrial facility or contact sulfuric 
acid plant may emit sulfur dioxide in concentrations greater than 500 parts per 
million. Regulation 2.5. 
21 The types of facilities listed in 121.3., note 2, supra. 
22 Regulation 12.3.1. 
23 462 F.2d 846, 3 E.R.C. 1682 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
24 42 U.S.C. §l857h-5 (1970). 
25 462 F.2d at 850-51, 3 E.R.C. at 1685. 
26 Id. at 851, 3 E.R.C. at 1685. As of this writing the EPA has taken no 
reported action pursuant to this remand. 
27 3 E.R.C. 1629, Eq. No. 94128 (Suffolk Super. Ct., Final Decree Jan. 27. 
1972) . 
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are more demanding than is necessary to meet the national standards.28 
On the other hand, if the EPA were unable to justify a particular 
secondary standard as necessary to protect the public welfare, it might 
be difficult for a 'state to justify a statute or regulation aimed at a 
similar objective. Such speculation is largely academic inasmuch as the 
Act specifies a thirty-day time limit for challenging promulgated stan-
dards.29 Kennecott was the only challenge within the period, and it re-
lates exclusively to the secondary standards for sulfur oxides. 
In Associated Industries the plaintiffs, an association and three of its 
fuel-consuming members,3o challenged the department's refusal to grant 
them either a one-year deferment for implementing the sulfur content 
regulations or a one-year general variance from the application of the 
regulations. Arguing that the primary and secondary standards were met 
by the limitations of Massachuse1!ts regulations previously in effect,31 
plaintiffs contended that the regulations implementing the Act were un-
necessary and arbitrary. The superior court rejected these arguments, 
holding, first, that the department's actions were reasonably supported 
by the evidence and, secondly, that the regulations need not be predicated 
on compliance with federal primary and secondary standards. The first 
holding was based on the familiar rule that the scope of judicial review 
of administrative action is limited Ito a determination of whether the 
administrative action " 'had reasonable support in the evidence.' "32 Such 
support was found in the testimony of "federal and state officials, and 
meteorological, medical and economic experts from the public and 
private sectors"33 relating to the concentrations of sulphur dioxide that 
could safely be emitted into the atmosphere. The second holding, as 
noted previously, was based on the department's statutory power to 
issue regulations to prevent or minimize pollution. Although the court 
concluded that the department's power was nCYt: limited to attaining or 
28 42 U.S.C. §1857 (1970). 
29 42 u.s.c. § 1857h-5 (1970). See also Getty Oil Company v. Ruckelshaus, 
342 F. Supp. 1006, 4 E.R.C. 1141 (D. Del. 1972), remanded for dismissal 467 
F.2d 349, 4 E.R.C. 1567 (3d Cir. 1972). 
30 The court held that the association had no standing in the case, relying on 
Kelley v. Board of Registration in Optometry, 351 Mass. 187, 192, 218 N.E.2d 
130, 133-34 (1966). But for a more liberal view of standing in environmental 
cases see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 u.S. 727 (1972). 
31 Sulfur content regulations promulgated pursuant to the Clean Air Act of 
1967 'limited the sulfur content of residual oil (1) burned in the core Metro-
politan Boston region, see note 8, supra, to 1.0% from October 1, 1970 to Sep-
tember 30, 1971, and to 0.5% thereafter, and (2) burned elsewhere in the state 
to 2.2% from October 1, 1970 to September 30, 1971, and to 1.0% thereafter. 
These regulations were approved by the EPA for the attainment of the primary 
standard for sulfur oxides in a letter to the Governor of Massachusetts dated 
August 4, 1971, notice of which was published in the Federal' Register on Feb-
ruary 3, 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 2581-82 (1972). 
32 3 E.R.C. at 1630, citing Insurance Co. of North America v. Commissioner 
of Insurance, 327 Mass. 745, 753, 101 N.E.2d 335, 340 (1951). 
33 3 E.R.C. at 1630. 
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maintaining primary and secondary standards,34 the holding is alterna-
tively based on its finding that there was "reasonable support in 
the evidence" to conclude that the second stage of the implementation 
plan (Le., the regulations in issue) was necessary for the 'maintenance 
and attainment' of the ambient air quality standards."35 The plaintiffs 
conceded that they bore the burden to prove that the requested variance 
would not interfere with the attainment or maintenance of air quality 
standards, and the court appeared to concur.36 If this principle is ex-
tended to variance applications generally, then the burden on future 
applicants will be a heavy one. 
Particulate matter regukztions. The Massachusetts strategy to reduce 
particulate matter contamination is to be accomplished, not only by the 
reduction in particulate emissions resulting from the sulfur oxide regula-
tions,37 but also through a number of regulations specifically aimed at 
controlling particulate matter emissions.3B Regulation 2 limits emissions 
of particulate matter from a number of sources including fossil fuel 
utilization facilities,39 ferrous cupola foundaries and non-ferrous found a-
ries,4O asphalt batching plants,41 incinerators,42 and other specified in-
dustrial sources.43 All such sources were to have submitted compliance 
schedules to the department by December 31, 1972.44 Following public 
hearing 45 and departmental approval,46, compliance schedules are to be 
34 See Getty Oil Company v. Ruckelshaus, note 29, supra. 
35 3 E.R.C. at 1631. 
36 Id. at 1630. 
37 40 C.F.R. U50A·, 50.5 and 51.13 (1972). 
38 The primary standards for particulate matter are: (1) an annual geometric 
mean of 75 micrograms per cubic meter, and (2) a maximum 24-hour concentra-
tion, not to be exceeded more than once a year, of 260 micrograms per cubic 
meter. 40 C.F.R. §50.6 (1972). The secondary standards are 60 and 150 micro-
grams per cubic meter, respectively. 40 C.F.R. §50.7 (1972). For particulate 
matter emission test methods and procedures see 40 C.F.R. §50.3 and Part 50, 
Appendix B (1972). 
39 Regulation 2.5.1. 
40 Regulation 2.5.2. 
41 Id. 
42 Regulation 2.5.3. 
43 Regulation 2.5.2. Other specified industrial facilities are those listed in §21.3., 
note 2, supra. 
44 Regulation 2.5. The Regulation originally required major sources, as defined 
in Definition 23, to submit compliance schedules by October 1, 1972, but enabled 
the department to allow other sources until December 31, 1973 to submit such 
schedules. This latitude was in contravention of 40 C.F.R. §51.15(a) (2) (1972) 
which required that states submit required compliance schedules to the EPA by 
February 15, 1973. Consequently the EPA disapproved this part of the Massa-
chusetts implementation plan. 37 Fed. Reg. 10872 (1972), inserting 40 C.F.R. 
§52.1125 (a) (1972). The Regulation was then amended to its present state, 
which the EPA then approved, 37 Fed. Reg. 23088 (1972), revoking 40 C.F.R. 
§52.1125 (a) (1972), promulgated by 37 Fed. Reg. 10972 (1972). 
45 40 C.F.R. §51.15(a)(2) (1972). 
46 Regulation 2.5. 
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submitted to the EPA for its approva1.47 Compliance schedules must 
provide for the achievement of the applicable emission limitation as 
soon as poss~ble but in no case later than January 1, 1975. Schedules 
contemplating achievement of the emission limitations later than Novem-
ber 30, 1973, must include specific increments of progress to be met by 
specified dates.48 The department may adopt a compliance schedule by 
order and may require more stringent emission limitations than other-
wise required by departmental regulations.49 Regulation 5, which limits 
the use of various types of fuel, limits the ash content of fossil fuels 
burned in the state to 9.0% by dry weight.5o Persons seIling or distributing 
fossil fuels for burning within the state must register with the depart. 
ment,51 keep pertinent records, including the ash content of fuel sold, 
and make such records available to the department.52 Regulation 7, 
with certain exceptions, prohibits the open burning of any materia1.53 
Emission sources must be registered under Regulation 12, and no in-
dustrial facility54 emitting more than five pounds of particulate matter 
per hour may be operated unless it is registered.55 Regulation 8 grants 
the department jurisdiction over incinerators. No incinerator may be 
sold, built, modified or used unless its design and operating procedure 
have been approved by the department.56 The department has com-
menced a suit against the Boston Housing Authority for the purpose of 
enjoining it from violating Regulation 8 through its continued use of 
more than five hundred incinerators of a design which has not been 
approved.57 No municipal, commercial or industrial incinerator may be 
built, modified or operated at a site not approved by the department58 
47 Id. 40 C.F.R. §51.15(a) (2) (1972). 
48 The stages include submittal' of engineering plans, ordering of equipment, 
installation date, and compliance date. Regulation 2.5. See also 40 C.F.R. §51.15 
(c) (1972). 
49 Regulation 2.5 provides that the department may adopt a schedule by order 
contingent upon approval of the source's engineering plans for compliance. 
50 Regulation 5.4.1. 
51 Regulation 5.1.5 .. 
52 Regulations 5.1.4(c) and 5.6. Distributors and shippers of fossil fuel must, 
upon demand, furnish their customer-users with satisfactory evidence of the ash 
content of fuel' sold to them. Regulation 5.4.2. 
53 Regulation 7.1. Exceptions include open burning for cooking, to assist in 
fighting fires, for training fire fighters, for agricultural and land clearing purposes, 
burning by blow-torches, bUTIling of fungus-infested elm wood and burning ap-
proved by the department as meeting stated criteria, all where no alternative 
method of disposal is available. When adverse meteorological' conditions would 
be aggravated by any open burning, the department may, after giving sufficient 
public notice, prohibit even the aforementioned burnings. Regulations 7.2.1 to 
7.2.8. 
54 Industrial facilities listed in §21.3, note 2, supra. 
55 Regulation 12.3.1(a). 
56 Regulations 8.1.1 to 8.1.4 and 8.2.1. 
57 Kolbe v. Boston Housing Authority, E. No. 95006 (Suffolk Super. Ct., 
Entered March 29, 1972). 
58 Regulations 8.2.1 and 8.3.1. 
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and no incinerator may be operated at a site if the department determines 
that its operation at that site is likely to cause a nuisance.59 Incinerators 
must meet emission limitations set for particulate matter60 and may not 
emit smoke with a density greater than No.1 on the Ringleman Chart 
(20% opacity).61 No incinerator capa:ble of reducing more than 1000 
pounds of refuse per hour may be operated unless it is registered.62 
The foregoing regulations are not expected to achieve the secondary 
standards for particulate matter in the Metropolitan Boston region.63 
The department therefore requested, and has received, an extension until 
November 30, 1972, to promulgate additional regulations which in con-
junction with the regulations outlines above, will achieve the secondary 
standards.64-
Nitrogen dioxide regulations. State implementation plans were required 
to establish a control strategy to limit nitrogen dioxide emissions suffi-
ciently to attain the federal primary and secondary standards,65 taldng 
into account specified projected reductions in nitrogen dioxide emissions 
resulting from federal motor vehicle emission standards.66 Many of the 
regulations designed to reduce emissions of sulfur oxides and particulates 
wil also reduce nitrogen dioxide emissions.67 Regulation 2 limits the 
amount of nitrogen dioxide per million BTU heat input capacity that 
may be emitted by fossil fuel utilization facilities.68 A new industrial 
facility69 or an existing industrial facility in a designated critical area 
may not emit more than 10 pounds of nitrogen dioxide per hour, while 
an existing industrial facility not in a designated critical area may not 
emit more than 20 pounds of nitrogen dioxide per hour. No industrial 
facility may emit nitrogen dioxide in concentrations greater than 250 
parts per million.7o Sources must meet these emission limitations within 
the time frame and in accordance with the same type of compliance 
schedule discussed previously with respect to particulate matter emission 
limitations set forth by Regulation 2. Regulation 6 provides that no 
visible air contaminant, other than water vapor, may be emitted from 
59 Regulation 8.1.5. See Regulations, Definition 5. 
60 Regulation 2.5.3. 
61 Regulation 6.2 and Regulations, Definition 8. 
62 Regulation 12.4.1. 
63 37 Fed. Reg. 10872 (1972), inserting 40 a.F.R. §51.1122(a) (1972). 
64- Id. 
65 The primary and secondary standards for nitrogen dioxide are identical: an 
annual' arithmetic mean 100 micrograms per cubic meter (0.05 parts per million). 
40 a.F.R. §50.11 (1972). For test methods and procedures see 40 a.F.R. §50.3 
(1972) and Part 50, Appendix F. 
66 40 C.F.R. 151.14 (1972). See 121.4, note 2, supra. 
67 See Table 2, supra. 
68 A new fossil fuel utilization facility with a heat input capacity in excess of 
250 million BTU per hour may not emit more than 0.3 pounds of nitrogen dioxide 
per million BTU, Regulation 2.5.1. 
69 An industrial facility of the type listed in §21.3, note 2, supra. 
70 Regulation 2.5.2. 
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an internal combustion engine (1) in a motor vehicle, for more than 
five seconds or for more than the first one hundred feet of travel and 
(2) in other than a motor vehicle, for more than ten seconds.71 Regula-
tion 11, which deals with transportation sources, states that, with certain 
exceptions, no motor vehicle may idle continuously for more than five 
minutes.72 Under the emission source registration requirement prescribed 
by Regulation 12, no industrial facility73 emitting more than one pound 
of nitrogen dioxide per hour may be operated unless it is registered.74 
Since these measures would not achieve the requisite reduction of 
nitrogen dioxide emissions in the Massachusetts section of the Hartford-
New Haven-Springfield interstate air quality control region, the EPA 
has discovered the department's nitrogen dioxide control strategy for 
that region.75 Presumably, the deficiency will be remedied by EPA-
promulgated regulations.76 It should be noted, however, that questions 
have been posed concerning the accuracy of methods used to test nitro-
gen dioxide levels.77 If these problems are resolved by the adoption of a 
new test method which shows lower concentrations of nitrogen dioxide 
in the region, the end result may be EPA approval of the department's 
nitrogen dioxide control strategy. 
Hydrocarbon regulations. The requirements outlined for state nitrogen 
dioxide control strategies apply as well to control strategies for hydro-
carbon emissions.78 Since over one-half of the hydrocarbons emitted orig-
inate in transportation sources79 which are subject to rigorous federal 
motor vehicle standards,8o the state control strategy for hydrocarbons is 
to a large extent, preempted and consequently is not as elaborate as 
the state strategy to combat sulfur dioxide or particulate matter con-
tamination. Although many departmental regulations have the incidental 
effect of reducing hydrocarbon emissions, only two provisions, Regulations 
2 and 12, are directed primarily towards their control. Regulation 2 re-
quires that storage tanks for "organic material,"81 be equipped with the 
71 Regulation 6.5. For visible emission limitations applicable to marine vessels, 
aircraft and diesel engines, see Regu'lations 6.3, 6.4 and 6.6, respectively. 
72 Regulation 11.1.2. For similar regulations applicable to diesel trains, aircraft 
and marine vessels, see Regulations 11.2, 11.3 and 11.4, respectively. 
73 Industrial facilities of the type listed in §21.3., note 2, supra. 
74 Regulation 12.3.1(d). 
75 37 Fed. Reg. 10872 (1972), inserting 40 C.F.R. §52.1124 (1972). 
76 42 U.S. C. §1857c-5(c) (1970). But see §21.2, notes 14-18 and accompanying 
text, supra. See also administrative stage (6), text at §21.2, note 10, supra. 
77 37 Fed. Reg. 11826, 11834 (1972), and 37 Fed. Reg. 23085-6 (1972). 
78 The primary and secondary standards for hydrocarbons are identical: a 
mrucimum three-hour concentration 6 to 9 a.m. not to be exceeded more than 
once per year of 160 micrograms per cubic meter (0.24 parts per million). 40 
a.F.R. §50.10 (1972). For test methods and procedures see 30 a.F.R. §50.3 and 
Part 50, Appendix E (1972). See also 40 a.F.R. §51.14 (1972). 
79 See Table 2, supra. 
80 See note 2, supra. 
81 Organic material "is generally defined as carbon compounds." Regulations, 
Definition 30. Regulation 2 applies primarily to petroleum products. 
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departmentally approved pollution control devices specified by Regula-
tion 2. This regulation applies primarily to petroleum product storage. 
Various types of equipment meeting department approval, such as vapor 
recovery systems and pressure tank systems, must be installed on certain 
storage tanks and fuel transfer systems.82 Storage tanks must meet these 
requirements within the same time period and in accordance with the 
same type of compliance schedule as that previously discussed with regard 
to particulate matter emissions83 limitations set forth under Regulation 
2. Regulation 12 provides that industrial facilitiesB+ emitting more than 
forty pounds of organic material per day may not be operated unless 
registered.85 
Carbon monoxide and photochemical oxidant regulations. The Act 
requires that state implementation plans embody control strategies to 
achieve national primary and secondary standards86 for carbon monoxide87 
and photochemical oxidants.88 Almost two-thirds of carbon monoxide 
emissions are generated by transportation sources. If noncontrollable 
sources such as forest fires and the like, are discounted, transportation 
sources may be said to be responsible for three-quarters of the carbon 
monoxide emitted.89 Photochemical oxidants are produced by the inter-
action of nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons in the presence of sunlight. 
Nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons are also produced primarily by trans-
portation sources,90 and the federal motor vehicle emission standards 
are expected to significantly reduce the emission of nitrogen oxides and 
hydrocarbons as well as carbon monoxide.91 Although several of the de-
82 A storage tank with a capacity of more than 40,000 gallons must be equipped 
with either a floating roof, a pressure tank system, a vapor recovery system, or 
other control device approved by the department. Such storage tanks containing 
an organic material with a true vapor pressure in excess of 11 pounds per 
square inch may utilize any approved control device except a floating roof. Com-
pare Regulations 2.5.4.1 and 2.5.4.2. Vapor recovery systems and vapor balance 
lines are required for specified types of storage tanks in connection with certain 
loading and unloading operations. Regulations 2.5.4.3 and 2.5.4.4. 
83 Regulations 2.5.4.1 to 2.5.4.4. 
B+ Industrial' facilities of the types listed in §21.3, note 2, supra. 
85 Regulation 12.3.1(c). 
86 40 C.F.R. §51.14 (1972). 
81 The primary and secondary standards for carbon monoxide are: ( 1 ) a 
maximum 8·hour concentration not to be exceeded more than once a year of 10 
miIligrams per cubic meter (9 parts per miIIion), and (2) a maximum I-hour 
concentration not to be exceeded more than once a year of 40 miIIigrams per 
cubic meter (35 parts per miIIion). 40 C.F.R. 150.8 (1972). For test methods 
and procedures, see 40 C.F.R. 150.3 and Part 50, Appendix C (1972). 
88 The primary and secondary standards for photochemical oxidants are identi· 
cal: a maximum l·hour concentration not to be exceeded more than once a year 
of 160 micrograms per cubic meter (0.08 parts per million). 40 C.F.R. §50.9 
(1972). For test methods and procedures see 40 C.F.R. 150.3 and Part 50, 
Appendix D (1972). 
89 See Table 2, supra. 
90 Id. 
91 See note 2, supra. 
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partment's regulations will effect a reduction of carbon monoxide and 
photochemical oxidant emissions, there are no regulations designed pri-
marily for their control. 
Because the EPA has determined that more control will be necessary 
to meet the standards for carbon monoxide and photochemical oxidants 
in the Metropolitan Boston region than in the other five regions, the 
department was required to adopt, by February 15, 1973, a transporta-
tion control strategy for that region. This strategy, together with the 
federal motor vehicle emission standards, and existing controls on hydro-
carbon emissions must meet the standards for carbon monoxide and 
photochemical oxidants in that region. Legislative authority and regula-
tions to implement the strategy are required by June 30 and December 
30, 1974, respectively.92 More controls will also be necessary to meet 
the standards for carbon monoxide in the Massachusetts sector of the 
Hartford-New Haven-Springfield interstate region. The department has 
therefore ·requested a two-year extension of the date by which the 
standards in that region must be attained. The EPA has granted the 
department's requested two-year extension of the date by which carbon 
monoxide standards in the interstate region must be attained.93 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, however, in 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency 
held that this and similar two-year extensions granted to other states could 
not be justified under the Act.94 It ordered states requiring transportation 
control strategies to submit, by April 15, 1973, implementation plans to 
achieve by May 31, 1975 primary air standards. Official notice of the re-
quirements, as modified by the court, was published by the EPA on March 
20, 1973.95 Massachusetts did not submit an implementation plan by the 
April 15 deadline. Under the court's order the EPA must therefore dis-
approve the Commonwealth's implementation plan on June 15, 1973 
insofar as it does not contain a transportation control strategy. If the 
Commonwealth has not developed and submitted an approvable strategy 
by August 15, 1973, the EPA must promulgate on that date and a plan 
implementing such a strategy. 
Complex Sources. Partially as a result of Natural Resources Defense 
Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, supra, states are also re-
quired to promulgate and submit implementation plans to control "com-
plex sources." "Complex sources" are facilities that affect air quality 
standards not because of their own emissions but because of other sources 
associated with them. They include airports, amusement parks, highways, 
shopping centers, sports facilities and parking areas, all of which may 
affect air quality standards because of emissions from the motor vehicles 
associated with them. States must promulgate plans to control complex 
92 37 Fed. Reg. 10873 (1972), inserting 40 a.F.R. §52.1128 (1972). 
93 37 a.F.R. 10872 (1972), inserting 40 a.F.R. §52.1122(b) (1972). 
94 -F.2d-, 4 E.R.a. 1945 (1973). 
95 -Fed. Reg.--. 
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sources and submit such plans to the EPA for approval by August 15, 
1973. The EPA then has until October 15, 1973 to approve or disapprove 
such plans and, in the case of disapproved plans, until December 15, 
1973 to promulgate its own regulations to correct the resulting deficiencies 
in the state implementation plan.96 
§21.5. Other provisions. The federal Act, state statutes and de-
partmental regulations all provide for the control of pollutants and 
sources of pollution other than those which, according to the Act, are 
to be controlled through the use of state implementation plans. The 
Clean Air Act deals specifically with these other types of air pollution 
in its provisions for the control of motor vehicle emissions, 1 motor 
vehicle fuels,2 aircraft emissions,3 emissions of pollutants determined by 
the EPA to be hazardous,4 and new sources for which the EPA publishes 
standards of performance.5 Under certain circumstances, the programs 
for the control of hazardous pollutants and for the establishment of 
standards of performance for new stationary sources may be delegated 
to the states.6 In addition, there is a provision for the control of air 
pollutants for which performance standards have not yet been established.' 
When these additional standards have been set, the states will be required 
to control such pollutants as they are emitted from existing as well as new 
sources. This result is accomplished in a fashion similar to that employed 
in the formulation of state implementation plans: each state must estab-
lish emission standards for such pollutants and provide for the implemen-
tation and enforcement of the standards. 
Massachusetts statutes presently control load spills from motor vehicles,8 
regulate excess fuel discharges from aircraft,9 and enable the department 
to adopt rules and regulations for the general purpose of preventing 
"pollution or undue contamination of the atmosphere."1o The provision 
96 See 38 Fed. Reg. 9599-9601, where the chronology established by the court 
is explained and where requirements for the complex source component of state 
implementation plans are proposed. 
§21.5. 1 See §21.4., note 2, supra. 
2 42 U.S.C. §1857f-6(c) (1970). 
3 Id. §1857f-9. 
4 Id. §1857c-7. Mercury, beryllium and asbestos have been declared 
hazardous, 36 Fed. Reg. 5931 ( 1971), and regulations have been proposed 
to control emissions of these substances, 36 Fed. Reg. 23239-56 (1971), but 
not promulgated. 
5 42 U.S.C. §1857c-6 (1970). New source performance standards have been 
promulgated for sulfuric and nitric acid plants, portland cement plants, incinera-
tors of more than 50 tons per day charging rate, and fossil fuel fired steam 
generators of more than 250 million BTU per hour heat input, 40 C.F.R. §§60.1 
to 60.85 (1972). 
6 Respectively, 42 U.S.C. §1857c-7(d) (1970),42 U.S.C. §1857c-6(c) (1970). 
, 42 U.S.C. §1857c-6(d) (1970). 
8 G.L., c. 85, §36. 
9 Id. c. 111, §142F. 
10 Id. c. 111, §§142B and 142D. 
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regarding fuel discharges from aircraft is partially pre-empted by the 
Act, since no state may enforce an emission standard which differs from 
the applicable federal standard.11 
The department has also issued regulations completely outside the 
scope of the Clean Air Act regarding fuel additives,12 dust,13 odor,14 and 
noise.15 The status of these regulations in relation to the Act poses an 
interesting problem. The promulgation of the regulations was not re-
quired by the Act but they were submitted to and apparently approved by 
the EPA as part of the Massachusetts implementation plan. It is question-
able whether these additional state regulations may be classified as part 
of an "applicable implementation plan" as defined by the Act16 and thus 
become enforceable by the federal government or by citizens. It is sub-
mitted that the regulations are not enforceable under the Act since no 
federal standards were established for these pollutants and the EPA 
approved the Massachusetts plan only to the extent that it provided for 
the "attainment and maintenance of the national standards."17 (Empha-
sis added). This is consistent with the Act's scheme, under which sub-
stantive regulations, i.e. regulations subject to federal enforcement, are 
based on standards previously established by the EPA. 
§21.6. Enforcement. As mentioned above, the scheme of the Clean 
Air Act vests in the states the primary responsibility for achieving and 
maintaining primary and secondary standards. 1 A necessary corollary 
of this scheme is that primary responsibility for enforcing state imple-
mentation plans is also vested in the states.2 
The department has promulgated three regulations which relate pri-
marily to enforcement. Regulation 12, which has already been discussed 
in reference to various specific pollutants, forbids the operation of major 
air pollution sources unless they register annually with the department. 
Regulation 13 provides that stack tests, when required by the department, 
must be conducted through the use of approved procedures by competent 
stack testing personnel in the presence of department personnel. The 
Regulation further requires that if the department desires to stack test 
for enforcement purposes, the source must allow the department access 
to the stack, and must provide erected scaffolding, sampling ports, and 
a power source. Regulation 14 requires categories or classes of sources 
designated by the department to install, maintain and use emission 
11 42 u.s.c. § 1857f-ll provides that no state may adopt or enforce any stan-
dard respecting an emission of any air pollutant from any aircraft different than 
a federal standard. 
12 Regulation 5.5. 
13 Regulation 9. 
14 Id. 
15 Regulation 10. 
16 42 U.S.C. §1857c-5(d) (1970). 
17 37 Fed. Reg. 10872 (1972), inserting 40 C.F.R. §52.1123 (1972). 
§21.6. 1 See §21.2., note 2, supra. 
2 42 U.S.C. §1857(a) (3) (1970). 
20
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1972 [1972], Art. 24
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1972/iss1/24
598 1972 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §21.6 
monitoring devices of a design approved by the department. All three 
regulations contain reporting requirements. 
The department's regulations relating to the Metropolitan Boston re-
gion are enforceable under the authority of G.L., c. 111, § 142B; regula-
tions pertaining to the rest of the Commonwealth are enforceable under 
G.L., c. 111, § 142D. Both sections make knowing violation of regulations 
punishable by fines of $10 to $50 per day. More importantly, the sections 
provide that the department, through the Public Health Council, may 
issue an order to any person responsible for an air pollution source to 
abate a violation of the department's regulations. The Commissioner of 
Public Health is also authorized to issue such an order.3 The issuance 
of abatement orders is, of course, subject to the state Administrative 
Procedure Act.4 Violation of an order is punishable by a fine of $50 to 
$100 a day for first offenses, and $200 to $500 per day for succeeding 
offenses. By statute, the superior court is granted jurisdiction in equity 
to enjoin violations of the department's regulations.5 Subject to various 
procedural requirements the department's regulations may also be en-
forced by private citizens.6 In at least one case, involving the faulty 
operation of a municipal incinerator, private citizens have initiated an 
enforcement action'? 
According to the Clean Air Act, either the EPA, through the federal 
enforcement provision, or an individual, through the citizen suit pro-
vision, may enforce the state implementation plan if the state has re-
fused or neglected to take action against a source in violation of a 
reguLation contained in the plan.8 If the violation relates to a particular 
pollution source, the EPA Administrator or his delegate9 must issue a 
notice of violation to the source and to the state in which the violation 
occurs. If the violation persists for more than thirty days after the 
issuance of notice, the EPA mustlO either issue an order requiring the 
3 G.L., c. 111, §2C. 
4 Id., c. 30A. 
5 Id., c. 111, §§142Band 142D. 
6 Id., c. 214, §10A. Qualified plaintiffs under the statute include ten citizens 
or a political subdivision. In either case plaintiffs must give 21 days notice to the 
Attorney General before filing suit. This provision is discussed in 1971 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §§8.2 to 8.5; and McGregor, Private Enforcement of Environmental 
Law: An Analysis of the Massachusetts Citizen Suit Statute, 1 Env. Affairs 606 
(1971). 
7 Bleiler v. Wellesley, 4 E.R.C. 1014, Eq. No. 104825 (Norfolk Super. Ct., 
Final Decree Dec. 23, 1971). 
8 Such enforcement action may be taken without regard to state enforcement 
procedures if taken pursuant to a provision of the Act which is not implemented 
by state plans, and the enforcement of which has not been delegated to the 
state involved. 
9 Authorization to issue notice of violation has been delegated to the Regional 
Administrators of the Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Order 1150.18, 
August 17, 1972. 
10 42 U.S.C. §1857c-8(a) (1) (1970). The use of the verb "may" instead of 
"shall" regarding the issuance of an order or the initiation of a civil action 
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source to comply with the requirements of the implementation plan11 
or commerce a civil action seeking compliance by a court order.12 The 
purpose of the thirty-day notice is to afford the state an opportunity to 
take remedial action before the federal order issues.!3 However, if the 
EPA finds that violations of an implementation plan result from the 
state's general failure to enforce its plan, it is empowered to assume 
total enforcement responsibility.14 In such an instance, the state must 
be given notice of the EPA's finding and be allowed thirty days to 
correct the situation. If the EPA determines that the state has not cor-
rected the deficiency within the thirty day period, it must give public notice 
might indicate that the EPA is not bound to take any of the specified courses 
of action upon finding that a violation has not been abated. It should be noted, 
however, that "may" is used before each of the two alternatives. The provision, 
it is submitted, is most logicaIly interpreted as meaning that although the Ad-
ministrator is not bound to take either of the two alternatives, he must take 
one of them. 
11 A compliance order was issued by the EPA against the Delmarva Power & 
Light Company. See Getty Oil Co v. Ruckelshaus, §2l.4, note 29, supra. 
12 The Act, as originaIly enacted, was not entirely clear on the extent of the 
EPA's power to enforce by bringing civil actions. Section 1857c-8(a) (1) provides 
that the EPA may issue an order or "bring a civil action in accordance with 
subsection (b)." But subsection (b) originaIly provided for civil actions only in 
given circumstances: (1) a violation of an EPA order; (2) a violation of a state 
implementation plan during a period of federaHy-assumed enforcement responsi-
bility continuing for more than 30 days after the EPA had issued a notice of 
violation to the source; or (3) a violation of provisions of the Act not imple-
mented by state plans. The problem was compounded by the fact that subsection 
(a) also gives the EPA the choice of an order or a civil action "in accordance 
with subsection (b)" both during periods of federaIly-assumed responsibility and 
for violations of provisions of the Act not imp}emented by state plans. At the 
same time, subsection (b) specificaIly provides for civil relief in the above cir-
cumstances. Of course, it could have been argued that the original subsection 
(b) should have been read to effectuate the clear intent of Congress in subsection 
(a) ( 1) that civil relief be available without prior recourse to an administrative 
order. Ultimately, the problem was averted by technical amendments to sub-
section (b) which made it clear that a civil action could be initiated for viola-
tions at any time during periods of federaIly-assumed enforcement and for viola-
tions continuing more than 30 days after the EPA had issued a notice of violation 
to the source decreeing other periods. Similar technical amendments to the 
provisions for criminal sanctions in § 113 ( c) were effected by the Comprehensive 
Health Manpower Training Act of 1971, which was signed by the President on 
November 11, 1971,85 Stat. 43l. 
13 Thirty days notice to the state is not required in cases where the Act con-
templates that the primary enforcement rol'e is federal rather than state. 42 U.S.C. 
§§1857c-8(a) (2) and (3) and 1857c-8(b) (2) (1970). Similarly, a private citi-
zen's secondary enforcement role is inherent in 42 U.S.C. §1857h-2(b) (1970), 
which requires the citizen seeking to enforce the Act to give sixty days prior 
notice to the EPA and the appropriate state, thus barring the citizen from com-
mencing his action if the Administrator or the State has previously done so and 
is diligently prosecuting the action. 
1442 U.S.C. §1857c-8(a) (2) (1970). 
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and thereafter assume enforcement responsibility until the state gives 
satisfactory evidence of its intent to enforce the plan. 
The only appreciable difference between total federal enforcement of 
the state's implementation plan and the ordinary supplemental enforce-
ment would appear to be in the prior notice that must be given to the 
source and to the state prior to federal administrative or court action. 
Whereas violation notice must be given to both parties when the EPA 
takes partial enforcement action, the statute does not require that com-
parable notice be sent to either the source or the state during periods when 
the EPA has assumed complete enforcement responsibility. Public notice of 
intended assumption of enforcement activity presumably suffices as notice 
to the state and potential polluter-defendants of imminent EPA enforce-
ment activity. The fedenal enforcement procedures available during 
periods of federally-assumed enforcement responsibility resemble the 
procedures for the enforcement of the provisions relating to hazardous 
pollutants and standards of perfonnance for new sources: no notice of 
contemplated action need to be sent to the offender prior to issuance 
of an order or prior to commencement of civil lactions.15 Nevertheless, 
except where there is a possible violation of a standard regarding hazard-
ous pollutants, the EPA may not issue an enforcement order until the 
source has been given an opportunity to attend an infonnal conference 
regarding the violation.16 Criminal penalties of up to $25,000 per day 
of violation and/or one year of imprisonment are provided for violation 
of: (1) EPA orders; (2) the hazardous emission or new source standard 
provisions; (3) the provisions of state implementation plans during 
periods of federally assumed enforcement responsibility; and (4) the 
provisions of state implementation plans more than 30 days after the 
Administrator has issued a notice of violation to the source. Second con-
victions carry penalties of up to $50,000 per day of violation, two years 
imprisonment, or bothP 
Enforcement actions may often be prosecuted with a minimum of 
discovery effort since the government may require a source to provide 
evidence of its violations of the Act. In the first administrative enforce-
ment proceeding under the Act,18 the EPA required the Delmarva Light 
& Power Company to reveal that it was burning oil with a higher 
sulfur content than allowed by applicable regulations. It did so pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. §1857c-9(a) (1) which provides that the EPA may require 
an emission source to: "(A) establish and maintain such records, (B) 
make such reports, (C) install, use, and maintain such monitoring equip-
15 42 U.S.C. §1857c-8(a) (3) (1970). Compare with 42 U.S.C. §1857c-8(a) (2) 
(1970). Violations of 42 U.S.C. §1857c-9, relating to inspections (see note 19, 
and accompanying text, infra) are also subject to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 
§1857c-8(a) (3) (1970). 
16 42 U.S.C. U857c-8(a)(4) (1970). 
17 42 U.S.C. §1857c-8(c) (1970). 
18 See Getty Oil Company (Eastern Operations) v. Ruckelshaus, §21.4, note 
29, supra. 
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ment or methods, (D) sample such emissions (in accordance with such 
methods, at such locations, at such intervals, and in such manner as the 
[EPA] shall prescribe), and (E) provide such other information as [the 
EPA] may reasonably require." Further, the EPA is given a right of entry 
to premises upon which an emission source is located, the right to inspect 
and copy records, the right to inspect monitoring equipment and the 
right to sample emissions.l9 Moreover, refusal to provide the foregoing 
information is itself a criminal act punishable by fine of up to $25,000 
per day of violation or by up to one year imprisonment, or both. 2o Pro-
viding false evidence is also a criminal act, entailing penalties up to 
$10,000 and six months imprisonment.21 These provisions of the Act 
and similar state provisions22 will perhaps be sUbjected to Fifth Amend-
ment scrutiny, since they require a source to provide the EPA with 
evidence that could be used in a criminal proceeding. However, as far 
as corporations, which are the major sources of air pollution, are con-
cerned, this possible constitutional objection may not be valid since it 
is well settled that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination does not extend to corporations. 23 
The only manner of avoiding enforcement when compliance with de-
partmental regulations is impossible or otherwise undesirable is to secure 
a variance. The department is authorized to issue a variance only when 
"necessary for the public good or to allay undue hardship."24 However, 
unless it is approved by the EPA, a variance will not preclude federal 
or citizen enforcement.25 Approval is required because a variance results 
in a de facto revision of the implementation plan control strategy and 
the Act requires EPA approval of all revisions to implementation plans.26 
19 42 U.S.C. §1857c-9(a) (2) (1970). 
20 42 U.S.C. §1857c-9(a) (1970) requires that an air poIlution source submit 
such information as the EPA may "reasonably require." Upon refusal by a source 
to furnish requested information the EPA may either issue an order requiring the 
source to furnish the information or bring a civil action to compel it to do so. 
42 U.S.C. §1857c-8(a) (3) (1970). 
21 42 U.S.C. §1857c-8(c) (2) (1970). 
22 See 42 U.S.C. §1857c-5(a) (2) (0), (F) and (G) (1970). The EPA Ad-
ministrator's authority under 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-9 may be delegated to the states. 
42 U.S.C. §1857c-9(b) (1970). Quaere the effect of such delegation if state 
law forbids state officials to engage in such activites? 
23 Wilson v. United States, 221 u.S. 361, 382 (1911). 
24 Regulation 50. 
25 37 Fed. Reg. 26312 (1972), inserting 40 C.F.R. §§51.4 and 51.6 (1972). 
See Getty Oil Company v. Ruckelshaus, §21.4, note 29, supra, where the plaintiff 
oil company discovered that its involvement in seeking a variance from state 
authorities was not aUowed to delay EPA enforcement since the relevant state 
regulation had been approved by the EPA and therefore became, for all practical 
purposes, a federal regulation also. 
26 42 U.S.C. §1857c-5(a) (3) (1970); 40 C.F.R. §51.6 (1972). It may be 
argued that if the state's regulations contain a variance provision, such as the 
department's Regulation 50, EPA approval of the state's implementation plan 
constituted an approval of the included variance provision and all variances issued 
under it. It is submitted that this argument is without merit. States were re-
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Where control devices and other means of compliance, such as low-
sulfur fuel, are available and the granting of a variance would cause a 
failure to attain the primary air quality standards "as expeditiously as 
practicable," EPA approval of variances in heavily-polluted areas should 
be withheld.27 The burden of proving that the standards will be met 
within the designated times notwithstanding the granting of a variance 
appears to rest on the variance applicant.28 Interestingly, the first two 
variances submitted to and approved by the EPA under the Act pertained 
to application of the department's sulfur content regulations in areas that 
do not appear to be heavily polluted.29 
B. WATER POLLUTION CONTROL 
§21.7. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 
1972. By the enactment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972 (the Amendments), 1 Congress revised existing 
water pollution control laws to create a water pollution aibatement plan 
as sweeping in scope and detail as that contained in the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1970.2 The premise that states bear primary responsibility 
for enforcement of pollution control has pervaded both federal air and 
water pollution control legislation. Nevertheless, the federal legislation 
requires that the EPA assume a state's water pollution control functions 
when the state fails or refuses to satisfy federal pollution control ob-
jectives. 
In addition to delineating the EPA's National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) obligations, the 1972 Amendments extend federal juris-
diction to all of the nation's waterways and preempt what had amounted 
to exclusive state jurisdiction over non-navigable waters.3 Water pollution 
quired to submit plans to achieve primary and secondary standards for the desig-
nated pollutants, 42 U.S.C. §l857c-5(a) (1) (1970), and the EPA approved 
plans only to the extent that they provided "for the attainment and maintenance 
of the national standards," 37 Fed. Reg. 10872 (1972), inserting 40 C.F.R. 
§51.ll23 (1972). A variance provision has no status under the Act since it is 
not required or contemplated by the Act nor is it directly related to the attain-
ment or maintenance of the national air quality standards. 
27 40 C.F.R. §§51.15(b)(I), 52.07 and 52.20(1972). 
28 Associated Industries of Massachusetts v. Frechette, 3 E.R.C. 1629, 1630, 
Eq. No. 94128 (Suffolk Super. Ct., Final Decree Jan. 27, 1972). 
29 37 Fed. Reg. 16177 (1972), and 37 Fed. Reg. 20117 (1972). 
§21.7. 1 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972), to be codified as 33 U.S.C. 
U1l51 et seq. 
2 Discussed at §21.2, supra. 
3 Amendments §502(7) defines "navigable waters" as "the waters of the United 
States, including the territorial seas," thus extending federal jurisdiction broadly 
over all United States waterways. The program established under the 1972 
Amendments, not only extends federal jurisdiction to all the nation's waterways, 
but it also requires permits for publicly-owned sewage treatment plants and 
municipally-controlled discharge points. Moreover, the overall thrust of the 
Amendments is aimed at national pollution problems, including poll.ution of 
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control objectives are to be accomplished by a "National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System,"4 an EPA-administered permit program 
supplanting that administered by the Army Corps of Engineers under 
the authority of the Refuse Act of 1899.5 The Refuse Act prohibited 
industrial pollutant discharges into navigable waterways except where 
authorized by permit. In 1971 the Army Corps of Engineers permit pro-
gram was effectively halted by the decision in Kalur v. Resor6 which 
required that the Corps file a NEPA impact statement for each permit 
issued.7 To a large extent, the 1972 Amendments alleviate this adminis-
trative bottleneck since, under the new permit program, the EPA must 
file NEPA impact statements only (1) where federal grants are provided 
to assist in the construction of publicly-owned waste treatment facilities; 
or (2) when the EPA issues a permit to a "new" source, that is, a source 
constructed after promulgation of final regulations prescribing per-
formance standards for that type of source.8 Consequently, the EPA 
waterways contained wholly within a single state. This is in sharp contrast with 
prior federal water pollution control enactments. Despite broad language in 
introductory sections of prior enactments which ostensibly extended federal water 
pollution control jurisdiction to all "waterways of the Nation," the actual 
extent of federal activities has been limited to matters pertaining to interstate 
waterways. 
4 Amendments, §402. 
5 Section 13 of the 1899 Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. §407 (1970), provides that it 
is unlawful "to throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to be 
thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other 
floating craft of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, 
or min of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other 
than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, 
into any navigable water of the United States, or into any tributary of any 
navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed into such navigable 
water; and it shall not be lawful to deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to be 
deposited material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water, 
or on the bank of any tributary of any navigabl'e water, where the same shall be 
liable to be washed into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, 
or by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded 
or obstructed: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall extend to, apply 
to, or prohibit the operations in connection with the improvement of navigable 
waters or construcion of public works, considered necessary and proper by the 
United States officers supervising such improvement or public work: And provided 
further, That the Secretary of [Army], whenever in the judgment of the Chief 
of Engineers anchorage and navigation will not be injured thereby, may permit 
the deposit of any material above mentioned in navigable waters, within limits 
to be defined and under conditions to be prescribed by him, provided application 
is made to him prior to depositing such material; and whenever any permit is 
so granted the conditions thereof shall be strictly complied with, and any viola-
tion thereof shall be unlawful." 
6335 F. Supp. 1, 3 E.R.C. 1458 (D.D.C. 1971). The Corps of Engineers ap-
pealed the decision but passage of the 1972 Amendments mooted the issue. 
7 The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §4321 et seq. (1970). See 
§§21.8-21.10, infra. 
8 A new source is defined in Amendments §306(a) (2). 
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would not be required to file NEPA reports for permits issued to pollution 
sources in existence before final regulations are promulgated.9 
Although the Amendments characterize the permit system as a "na-
tional" program, the necessity for state participation is recognized. Where 
a state adequately demonstrates its capability and willingness to administer 
the permit system for its own waters in conformance with the national 
guidelines, the EPA may delegate that administrative responsibility to 
the state. lO As a necessary corollary, the Amendments require the state 
to appraise EPA of its administration of the program.!1 Where the EPA 
determines that administration by a state is inadequate, it must revoke 
the delegation of responsibility and resume its administration of the plan.12 
Therefore, if Massachusetts is to retain jurisdiction of water pollution 
control efforts within its boundaries, it must satisfy the EPA that relevant 
statutes and regulations facilitate implementation of the federal permit 
program. If the present Massachusetts water pollution control apparatus 
does not satisfy EPA requirements,13 significant amendments to the Mas-
sachusetts Clean Waters Act14 will be necessary. 
9 Amendments, §511(c). While the Amendments thus limit the EPA's NEPA 
obligations to these two instances and consequently exempt a sizeable portion of 
its permit-issuing activities (i.e., re existing pollution sources), the bureaucratic 
burden created for the Massachusetts permit-issuing authority (the division of 
water pollution control) by G.L., c. 30, §§61 and 62, the Massachusetts environ-
mental review statute, MEPA, see §§21.8-21.1O, infra, will not be similarly 
ameliorated. MEPA, instead, would appear to require the filing of an impact 
statement in conjunction with each permit issued under state administration of the 
national permit program. 
10Id. §§402(a) (5), (b), and (c) (1) and (2). 
11 Id. §§402(d) (1) and (2). 
12 Id. §402(c) (3). 
13 The EPA has promulgated regulations listing the elements which a state 
permit program must contain in order to participate in the National' Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System. Under these regulations, a state permit-issuing 
agency must have authority to: "(a) issue permits for terms not exceeding 5 years 
upon the same conditions relating to effluent limitations and water quality stan-
dards as are applicable to permits issued by the [EPA]; (b) adequately notify 
members of the public, other States, and the Secretary of the Army of pending 
permit applications; (c) abate violations of permits, including civil and criminal 
penalties; (d) insure that the State permitting agency receive adequate notice 
of new introductions or substantial changes in the volume or character of pollu-
tants introduced into publicly owned treatment works; and (e) insure that any 
industrial user of publicly owned treatment works complies with pretreatment 
effluent standards and other requirements. The State must also have an approved 
continuing planning process under section 303 (e) of the [1972 Amendments] 
before approval of its permit program can be granted. 
"In addition to these requirements, a State permit program cannot be approved 
unless it conforms to guidelines issued under section 304(h) (2) of the [1972 
Amendments] prescribing minimum procedural and other elements of any State 
program under section 402. Thes guidelines ... must include, but are not 
limited to, monitoring and reporting requirements (including procedures to make 
information available to the public), enforcement provisions, and re.quirements 
for funding, personnel qualifications, and manpower." 37 Fed. Reg. 24087 
(1972), republished 37 Fed. Reg. 28390 (1972). 
14 G.L., c. 21, §§26-58, inclusive. 
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C. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: MEPA 
§21.8. MEPA: Introduction. During the 1972 SURVEY year the 
Massachusetts legislature created a state environmental review process, 
by enacting the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA),l 
modeled after the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).2 MEPA 
requires every st~ departIl!~Ilt~ PQard. co~~sion. and. authQrity 
to analyze the enVIronmental impact of all their "works, projects and· 
activities," and to minimize any anticipated damage by all practicable 
means. Comparable federal impact evaluation requirements have made 
NEPA one of the most litigated federal environmental statutes yet 
enacted; almost one hundred cases involving its application have been 
decided in federal courts since the statute was passed in 1970. 
NEPA requires that proposals by federal agencies for "major .. '1 
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" J 
must be accompanied by a "detailed statement" which describes: 
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any 
adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the 
proposal he implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's en-
vironment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term 
productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments 
of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should 
it be implemented.3 
The basis for most of the litigation arising under NEPA has been the 
adequacy of the impact statement for a particular project. When federal 
agencies have undertaken projects without filing impact statements, or 
when the statements filed appeared inadequate, private citizen groups 
have sought to enjoin the proposed federal action. Many of these suits 
have successfully challenged federal activities ranging from housing pro-
jects to the proposed trans-Alaskan pipeline.4 Other NEPA suits have 
§21.8. 1 Acts of 1972, c. 781 amended the General' Laws by inserting Sec-
tions 61 and 62 into Chapter 30 and by inserting Section lID into Chapter 12. 
G.L., c. 30, §§61 and 62, inserted by Acts of 1972, c. 781, §2, create the MEPA 
environmental review process discussed infra. Acts of 1972, c. 781, §l inserted 
G.L., c. 12, § lID, thereby establishing a division of environmental protection 
in the department of the attorney general. Acts of 1972, c. 781, §1 also granted 
the attorney general additional enforcement powers, including the power to 
initiate suite to enforce environmental laws without awaiting an enforcement re-
ferral by a state agency. As a practical matter, however, G.L., c. 12, §lID will 
not appreciably change existing procedures for environmental protection since the 
attorney general had already formed an environmental protection division by 
administrative order. 
2 42 U.S.C. §4321 et seq. (1970). 
3 Id. §4332(2) (B). 
4 See generally GREEN, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT IN THE 
COURTS (Conservation Foundation, Washington D.C., 1972). 
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failed, but in the process they have settled many basic issues involved 
in the environmental review process. Against the background of this 
federal environmental review experience, the ramifications of the MEPA 
impact statement requirement become apparent. MEPA must be ex-
amined not only for questions of statutory interpretation, but also with 
reference to the decisional and administrative development of comparable 
NEPA provisions. 
§21.9. MEPA Section 61. G.L., c. 30, §61 provides that "agencies, 
departments, boards, commissions and authorities of the commonwealth 
shall review, evaluate, and determine the impact on the natural environ-
ment of all works, projects or activities conducted by them" and that 
they "shall use all practicable me¢s and measures to minimize damage 
to the environment."l The statut~/would not seem to encompass political 
subdivisions, since they are nq{ specifically mentioned. However, "au-
thorities" of political subdivisions are specifically included in the provi-
sions of Section 62, discussJI below. . 
Works, projects or activities are broad terms designed to include a 
multitude of state gover~ental functions. They should be construed as 
broadly as tge~comparable NEP~ term, "federal action," which has been 
held to incl~e licensing activiti~,2 cancellation of government contracts,3 
sale of leases"fQr oil and s.-asextraction,4 and issuance of water pollution 
control permits~ndef 'NEP A, however, some "federal actions" have 
been excluded from the impact statement filing requirement where special 
considerations applied. Action by the Federal Price Commission approving 
increased mass transit fares, for example, was exempted from NEPA be-
cause of the need for immediate action.6 Likewise, approval of leases of 
Indian trust lands was exempted in part from NEPA because other en-
vironmental legislation specifically applied to the leases.7 It is possible 
that some works, projects or activities involving special considerations 
may be similarly exempted from the MEPA environmental review re-
quirement. Given the broad purpose underlying the MEPA legislation, 
however, works, projects or activities should be construed to include 
virtually all programs supported or directed by the commonwealth. 
Section 61 requires that state administrative bodies scrutinize the 
environmental impact of a proposed activity and determine whether "all 
§21.9. 1 Acts of 1972, c. 731, §2. 
2 Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Com. v. United States A.E. Comm'n., 449 F.2d 1109, 
2 E.R.C. 1779 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
3 National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 2 E.R.C. 1372 (10th Cir. 
1971 ). 
4 Natural Resources Defense CouncH, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 3 E.R.C. 
1558 (D.C. Cir. 1971), affirming 337 F. Supp. 165, 3 E.R.C. 1473 (D.D.C. 
1971) and 337 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1971). 
5 Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 3 E.R.C. 1458 (D.D.C. 1971). 
6 Cohen v. Price Commission, 337 F. Supp. 1236, 3 E.R.C. 1548 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972). 
7 Davis v. Morton, 335 F.Supp. 1258, 3 E.R.C. 1546 (D. N. Mex. 1971). 
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feasible measures have been taken to avoid or minimize [that] impact." 
The scope of this review appears far more comprehensive than the review 
contemplated by NEPA. Federal agencies are required only to make a 
detailed and objective appraisal of the environmental consequences of 
proposed action. Once the effects of an action have been fully set forth 
in the impact statement, the NEPA requirements have been satisfied.8 
By contrast, impact reports filed under MEPA must not only appraise 
the environmental impact of the proposed action, but they must also 
demonstrate that the least environmentally-destructive option has been 
chosen. Because of this limitation, MEPA has a far greater potential for 
preventing the deterioration of the environment than the federal statute. 
The stringency of MEPA reporting requirements is somewhat diluted, 
however, by the inconsistent use of the operative words "feasible" and 
"practicable" in Section 61.9 What is "feasible" or "practicable" in a 
particular situation will surely be hotly contested. Whereas it may be 
"feasible" from an engineering standpoint to follow the least-destructive 
alternative, it may not be economically "practicable." The use of such 
mutually inconsistent terminology raises issues under MEPA which do 
not exist under the national act. 
In anticipation of the interpretive issues that may be raised by the 
arguably inconsistent usage of the terms "feasible" and "practicable," 
another unique provision of MEPA should be considered. Section 61 also 
provides that, "[u]nless a clear contrary intent is manifested, all statutes 
shall be interpreted and administered to minimize and prevent damage 
to the environment." This legislatively-imposed rule of statutory con-
struction is obviously intended to inject an environmental awareness into 
the application of all state laws-an objective consistent with the funda-
mental rationale of MEPA that environmental consequences should be 
an important consideration in all governmental decision-making. Whether 
8 Section 102(2) of NEPA [42 U.S.C. §4332(2) (1970)] details the operating 
procedures which must be followed to insure that the impact report filed by the 
federal agency is a careful evaluation of the proposal's environmental impact. 
Sections 101 [42 U.S.C. §4331 (1970)] and 102(1) [42 U.S.C. §4332(1) (1970)] 
of NEPA state the policy goals to be achieved by the statute. The courts have 
rigorously interpreted the requirements of Section 102 (2) but paid mere lip-
service to the thrust of Sections 101 and 102 (1). See Cohen and Warren, Judicial 
Recognition of the Substantive Requirements of the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, 13 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 685 (1972). 
9 The inconsistency is found in the following language of Section 61: "All 
agencies, departments, boards, commissions and authorities of the commonwealth 
shall review, evaluate, and determine the impact on the natural' environment of 
all works, projects or activities conducted by them and shall use all practicable 
means and measures to minimize damage to the environment .... Any determina-
tion made by an agency of the commonwealth shall include a finding describing 
the environmental' impact, if any, of the project and a finding that all feasible 
measures have been taken to avoid or minimize said impact." (Emphasis added). 
Although the two words have synonymous meanings in some dictionaries, it is 
submitted that they may-and should-be given different meanings by the 
judicial and administrative bodies that interpret them. 
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the rule of statutory construction can impose an environmental con-
sciousness upon activities not expressly covered by MEPA is questionable. 
It is submitted that this rule of construction has practical pertinence only 
in MEPA contexts.1o 
The requirement to review, evaluate, and determine would appear to 
be retroactive as to "on-going" projects.11 If this is so, administrative 
bodies must determine the environmental impact of projects commenced 
before the effective date of the statute and use all "practicable measures" 
to limit environmental damage caused thereby. However, the extent of 
such measures that must be undertaken is unclear. Undoubtedly, re-
design of a completed project is not "practicable" and is thus beyond the 
scope of the statute. Moreover, it would be clearly impossible to make 
even moderate changes in every project in Massachusetts so as to amend 
its environmental impact. The statute does, however, contemplate a 
review of existing activities, to assess their environmental effects and to 
determine what can be done to reduce damage. If MEPA is construed 
as applying to all on-going state projects, one of the major defects of 
NEPA will be avoided. Federal courts have been required to determine 
on a case by case basis which projects were far enough along at NEPA's 
effective date to avoid its application.12 A Massachusetts court faced 
with the claim that Section 62 does not apply to activities commenced 
prior to the effective date of the Section13 will probably be able to side-
10 In utilizing this rule to resolve the apparent conflict between the tenns 
"feasible" and "practicable" in Section 61, a more sensible construction might 
be that the option which would minimize environmental injury is to be selected, 
unless it would present overwhelming difficulties grossly disproportionate to its 
benefits. The balancing of interests effected by this approach would bear a heavy 
predilection in favor of the option presenting the optimum environmental result: 
that option would prima facie be the one selected unless opponents meet a heavy 
burden of countervailing proof. 
11 The language of the statute reads: "All agencies ... shaH review, evaluate, 
and determine the impact . . . of all works, projects or activities conducted by 
them .... " (Emphasis added). The tense of the operative word "conducted" 
would seem to include activities. presently under way as well as those to be 
initiated in the future. Thus, if Section 61 is construed to impose an environ-
mental review requirement on on-going projects, the more elaborate impact report 
procedure described in Section 62 is addressed only to projects yet to be started. 
Section 62 provides: ''No agency ... shall commence any work, project, or 
activity • . . until sixty days after it has published a final environmental impact 
report." (Emphasis added). It is submitted that the divergent tenninology between 
Sections 61 and 62 reflects the legislature's intent to make Section 61 applicable 
to both on-going and future state projects and to limit Section 62 to prospective 
projects. 
For a distinction between "on-going" projects and "continuing" projects under 
NEPA, see Lee v. Resor, 4 E.R.C. 1579, 1581 (M.D. Fla. 1972). 
12 See, e.g., Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 
3 E.R.C. 1995 (4th Cir. 1972); Brooks v. Volpe, 460 F.2d 1193, 3 E.R.C. 1858 
(9th Cir. 1972); Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 454 F.2d 
613, 3 E.R.C. 1421 (3rd Cir. 1971). 
13 G.L., c. 30, §61 became effective December 31, 1972; G.L., c. 30, §62 
becomes effective July 1, 1973. Acts of 1972, c. 731, §3. 
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step the issue by requiring an environmental review and a determination 
as to "feasibility" and "practicability" under Section 61. Any new state 
activities will, of course, be subject to the requirements of Section 62. 
Damage to the environment,14 defined in Sections 61 and 62, corre-
sponds to the meaning given it in G.L., c. 214, §lOA, a statute authorizing 
enforcement of environmental laws and regulations by private lawsuits.15 
In both MEPA and in G.L., c. 214, §lOA, damage to the environment 
specifically excludes any "insignificant damage." If the Section 61 en-
vironmental impact finding concludes that more than "insignificant" 
damage to the environment will result from the proposed state activity, 
an environmental impact report will be required under Section 62. 
Whether or not an impact report is required, however,the Section 61 
findings, must include a description of the anticipated environmental 
impact and a determination that all "feasible" protective measures have 
been taken. To be meaningful, such findings must be based upon sup-
porting facts derived from the agency's review process and, presumably, 
may be challenged if the conclusions are not based upon an adequate 
investigatory process. 
§21.1O. MEPA Section 62. G.L., c. 30, §62 requires that state 
governmental units and authorities of political subdivisions prepare 
and publish an environmental impact report prior to commencing "any 
work, project, or activity which may cause damage to the environment." 
With the exception of work necessary to prepare this impact report, the 
section proscribes activity of any sort in furtherance of the project until 
sixty days following either publication of a final report or completion 
of any public hearing held in connection with the report. Preparation 
of the impact report is to be initiated during the project's earliest plan-
ning stages. The preparation and dissemination of the report must be 
sufficient to alert interested parties to the expected environmental con-
sequences of and alternatives to the project. This. report is to be cir-
culated among interested parties prior to the commitment of state monies 
for and the commencement of any work on the project. Those state 
agencies which have statutory jurisdiction over the proposed activity, 
or which have special expertise pertaining to the anticipated environ-
mental impact, must attach written comments to the final report. 
14 As defined in MEPA, "damage to the environment" means "any destruction, 
damage or impairment, actual or probable, to any of the natural resources of the 
commonwealth and shall include but not be limited to air pollution, water pollu-
tion, improper sewage disposal, pesticide pollution, excessive noise, improper 
operation of dumping grounds, impairment and eutrophication of rivers, streams, 
flood plains, lakes, ponds, or other surface or subsurface water resources, or 
destruction of seashores, dunes, marine resources, wetlands, open spaces, natural 
areas, parks, or historic districts or sites. Damage to the environment shall not 
be construed to include any insignificant damage to or impairment of such re-
sources." A similiar definition is found in G.L., c. 214, § IDA. See note 15, infra. 
15 G.L., c. 214, §lOA was inserted by Acts of 1971, c. 732, §1 and is dis-
cussed in 1971 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§S.2-S.5. 
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The final report is then submitted to the Secretary of Environmental 
Affairs (hereinafter the secretary) who must issue a written statement 
commenting on the adequacy of the report's compliance with the pro-
visions of Section 62. Although there is no prescribed sanction for sub-
mitting an inadequate report such a determination would be a formidable 
obstacle for the reporting agency in any suit brought to halt the project. l 
Furthermore, an adverse determination by the secretary would probably 
preclude further work on the project until the deficiency is corrected. 
Otherwise, the statutory purposes would be undercut. Whether the 
publication of a final report wiH toll the sixty day waiting period 
should therefore depend upon the secretary's determination of the 
report's compliance with MEPA provisions. 
r- §21.10. 1 Neither Section 61 nor Section 62 indicates how, and by whom, a 
uuit may be brought to enforce MEPA. One answer to this question may be 
found by examining the extent to which these MEPA sections have a nexus in 
common with the private right of action statute, G.L., c. 214, §10A, reviewed 
in 1971 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§8.2-8.5. In both of these statutes there is a 
similar definition of "damage to the environment", see §21.9, note 14, supra. 
Arguably, both statutes seek to facilitate public scrutiny and review of those 
actions which have a potential for environmental damage. It is possible, therefore, 
that a state agency which fails to make the evaluation and finding required by 
Section 61, or which fails to publish a report required by Section 62, may be 
subject to a Section lOA suit in equity, to enjoin further progress on the disputed 
"work, project or activity." 
The manner in which a citizen suit brought under Section lOA is likely to 
influence, or be influenced by, the MEPA environmental review requirement 
may revolve around a member of issues: (1) the seriousness of the asserted damage 
to the environment; (2) the asserted MEPA deficiency (i.e., whether the report 
is allegedly inadequate or whether no report was in fact filed) ; or (3) the action, 
if any, which the secretary has taken on the controverted report. In instances 
where a citizens' suit has been dismissed because the alleged environmental damage 
was "insignificant," there would be no further question concerning the necessity 
of any MEPA filing since the court's determination would automatically exempt 
the proposed "work, project or activity" from the operation of MEPA. Where a 
citizens' suit challenges either the adequacy of a report or the necessity for a filing 
thereof, the primary issues will concern fulfillment of statutory obligations. As 
discussed previously, any determination of adequacy made by the secretary will 
preclude further litigation on that issue. Absent regulations providing for a 
public hearing procedure, it would appear that judicial review of the secretary's 
determination could not be had under the Massachusetts Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, G.L., c. 30A, since § 14 of that Act requires an "adjudicatory pro-f ceeding" prior to judicial ,review. It may be possible to argue that, not withstanding the ten citizen requirement 
of G.L., c. 214, §10A, standing is conferred on any individual' or group as an 
implicit part of the MEPA statute. This approach has been adopted in the 
federal courts with regard to NEPA, see West Virginia Highlands Conserv. v. 
rIsland Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d232, 2 E.R.C. 1422 (4th Cir. 1971). However, the close nexus between the private right of action statute and MEPA may lead 
some Massachusetts courts to limit enforcement of MEPA to actions brought 
under G.L., c. 214, §lOA. Moreover, Acts of 1972, c. 784, see 121.11, infra, pro-
vides that the private right of action statute is to be the means by which citizens 
enforce the wetlands protection provisions of G.L., c. 131, §40. See §21.11, note 
5, infra. 
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Compared with provisions of the federal statute, the MEPA adminis-
trative approval requirement is innovative. NEPA impact statements 
must be reviewed by the EPA and the President's Council on Environ-
mental Quality.2 Although both agencies may criticize an impact re-
port, neither is charged with the duty of determining whether the report 
adequately complies with statutory standards.3 Consequently, the final 
arbiter of the adequacy of NEPA reports is the federal court system, 
and its decisions are often made without the benefit of any environ-
mental expertise beyond that supplied by the preparing agency. Federal 
courts have found impact statements inadequate on several grounds 
including (1) failure of the agency to prepare and evaluate the report 
itself and reliance, instead, upon a report prepared by a prospective 
beneficiary of the proposed plan;4 (2) failure to consider all relevant 
environmental factors;5 (3) failure to discuss reasonable alternatives to 
the proposed plan which might be less damaging to the environment;6 
( 4) failure to circulate the impact statement to other agencies with 
pertinent expertise;' or (5) failure to give public notice of the com-
pleted impact statement.8 Federal courts have generally required that 
the findings of environmental effect be supported by "substantial evi-
dence"9 and be made upon a record which is sufficient to permit an in-
formed and objective decision.'o 
Under MEPA, however, the function of evaluating impact statements 
will be administrative rather than judicial. Faced with a determination 
of non-compliance by the secretary, the proposing agency may either 
attempt to correct the deficiencies of the statement or proceed with the 
project despite the adverse determination. However, a citizen suitchal-
lenging the project would be far more likely to succeed if the agency 
pursues its plan notwithstanding the secretary's adverse determination. 
Courts should defer to the secretary's environmental expertise unless 
his determination can be shown to be a clear abuse of discretion. Of 
course the ultimate finality of the secretary's determination may be 
resolved on a political level-in the governor's office. 
Regardless of the course any controversy concerning a MEPA impact 
statement may take, the adequacy of the report will probably not be 
2 See Council on Environmental Quality Guidelines, 36 Fed Reg. 7724 (1971). 
3 Id. Section 10. 
4 Greene County Planning Board v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 3 E.R.C. 1595 (2d Cir. 
1972). 
5 Hanly v. MitcheIl, 460 F.2d 640, 4 E.R.C. 1152 (2d Cir. 1972). 
6 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 3 E.R.C. 1558 
(D.C. Cir. 1972). See §21.9, note 4, supra. 
7 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 170 (D.D.C. 
1972) . 
8 United States v. 247.37 Acres, 3 E.R.C. 1696 (S.D. Ohio 1972). 
9 Scenic Hudson Preserv. Conf. v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463, 3 E.R.C. 1232 (2d Cir. 
1971) . 
10 Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng. of U. S. Army, 325 F. Supp. 
749, 2 E.R.C. 1260 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
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detennined in a judicial forum. The resolution of MEP A impact state-
ment controversies on an administrative level will undoubtedly promote 
a more professional appraisal of complex technical issues than has been 
the case in NEPA litigation. The interagency give-and-take that is 
likely to result under MEPA, moreover, should produce impact reports 
of higher quality than those produced under the federal procedure. Court 
opinions seldom explain how a defective NEPA report may be cured; 
presumably, in MEPA controversies, the secretary will be willing to make 
at least an informal explanation. 
On the other hand, the secretary's role as environmental arbiter may 
create some new difficulties not experienced under NEP A. Once the 
secretary has ruled that a report meets all the requirements of MEPA, 
it will be difficult or impossible for a citizen lawsuit to upset this deter-
mination. MEPA thus removes from private citizens and state courts the 
ability to review the environmental wisdom of state works, projects or 
activities. Instead, it will be the secretary alone who will make this re-
view of projects for which a report is filed. The secretary answers to the 
Governor; and it is not inconceivable that pressure could be put upon 
the secretary to approve the report of a favored project, perhaps with 
promises of correcting deficiencies as the project proceeds. The extent to 
which the MEPA process would thereby be undermined is, at best, a 
subject for speculation. Suffice it to say that the MEPA review process 
may require some refinements to prevent this type of political erosion. 
It is submitted that a public hearing procedure should be developed to 
ensure public participation in the secretary's review. The secretary's 
findings in controversial cases would thereby be accompanied by an 
evidentiary record and citizen comment. Such a procedure would 
strengthen public confidence in the secretary's decisions and insure that 
extraneous considerations would not dominate the decision-making pro-
cess. Section 62 requires that each of the cabinet secretaries adopt regula-
tions to implement the MEPA review process. These regulations should 
provide such a public hearing requirement. 
D. OTHER MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 
§21.11. Wetland protection procedures. Chapters 782 and 784 of 
the Acts of 1972 effect other changes in Massachusetts environmental 
law by altering procedures for wetland protection. Chapter 784 incor-
porates former G.L., c. 130, §27A into G.L., c. 131, §40 to create a single 
procedure for regulating activities affecting all wetlands, coastal as well 
as inland. It also effects a notable change in regulatory power. Whereas 
Section 40 formerly vested exclusive power in the department of natural 
resources to regulate by order the manner in which activities affecting 
wetland were to be conducted,l it now vests primary regulatory authority 
§ 21.11. 1 Protective orders, whether issued by the department under prior 
law or issued by a municipality [see note 2, infra], pursuant to Chapter 784, 
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in the municipality2 where the proposed activity is to be conducted. 
Previously, municipalities3 could only recommend what measures should 
be included in the department's regulatory order to protect the public 
interest. They now have jurisdiction to issue such orders themselves. The 
department is not completely divested of jurisdiction over wetland con-
trol, however, for Chapter 784 also stipulates that if any party, including 
the department, is dissatisfied with an order issued by a municipality pur-
suant to Chapter 784, the local order may be reviewed by the department. 
Any order subsequently issued by the department supersedes the local 
order. The department's order may be reviewed, in turn, under the state 
Administrative Procedure Act.4 Chapter 784 also provides for stringent 
civil remedies and criminal penalties for violation of its provisions.5 
Chapter 782 supplements Section 40A of Chapter 313 with a more 
must be predicated upon a determination by the regulating authority that the 
site of the proposed activity requires special protection. Under the former version 
of G.L., c. 131, HO, the department was required to determine that the site 
was "essential to public or private water supply, to the ground water supply or 
to proper flood control." The former version of G.L., c. 131, §27A permitted 
the division of marine fisheries to protect shei'lfish or other marine resources by 
imposing conditions on work projects which were to be carried out in or near 
areas within which such resources were located. Chapter 784 now requires that 
the municipality make a determination that the site is "significant to public or 
private water supply, to the ground water supply, to flood control, to storm 
damage prevention, to prevention of pollution, to protection of land containing 
shellfish, or to the protection of fisheries" as a sine qua non to the exercise of its 
power to issue any protective order. 
2 The statute now provides that the hearings conducted by municipalities for 
regulatory purposes are to be held by "the conservation commission or, if none 
[by] the board of selectmen in a town or [by] the mayor of a city." G.L., c. 
131, §40. 
3 The statute requires that, prior to the issuance of notice of local hearings, 
the applicant must obtain "all permits, variances and approvals required by local 
by-law with respect to the proposed activity." (Emphasis added). Although Chap-
ter 784 was enacted as a wetlands protection statute, it is possible to construe 
the above requirement as requiring that the applicant procure some permits, 
variances and approvals that, although integrally related to the entire project, 
have no relevance to that portion of the project affecting wetlands. 
4 G.L., c. 30A. 
5 "Any person who purchases, inherits or otherwise acquires real estate upon 
which work has been done in violation of the provisions of this section or in 
violation of any order issued under this section shall forthwith comply with any 
such order or restore such real estate to its condition prior to any such violation. 
Any court having equity jurisdiction may restrain a violation of this section and 
enter such orders as it deems necessary to remedy such violation, upon the 
petition of the attorney general, the commissioner of natural resources, a city or 
town, an owner or occupant of property which may be affected by a said removal, 
filling, dredging or altering, or ten residents of the commonwealth under the 
provisions of [G.L., c. 214, §10Al 
"Whoever violates any provision of this section shall be punished by a fine of 
not more than one hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than six 
months or both." G.L., c. 131, BO. 
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refined statement of procedures by which the department may protect 
inland wetlands and flood plain areas. Section 40A now provides that 
the department, by its commissioner, may issue orders establishing the 
conditions under which activities in inland wetlands must be conducted.6 
It also grants the department power to establish certain inviolate zones 
in which "no obstruction or encroachment shall be placed by any per-
son, firm or corporation, public or private, unless authorized" by the 
department. Finally, the new Section 40A strengthens the department's 
authority to act in the face of local opposition: in addition to shortening 
from one year to six months the time that the department must refrain 
from proceeding to promulgate its regulations when faced with local 
objections thereto, Chapter 784 also requires that local objections must 
be supported by a written statement indicating the reasons for opposition. 
Sections 40 and 40A provide a somewhat complementary-albeit 
muddled~approach to the problem of inland wetland protection. The 
procedure established by the new Section 40 allows municipalities to 
protect wetlands within their jurisdiction which are not otherwise pro-
tected by the department pursuant to Section 40A. Section 40A on the 
other hand, allows the department wide latitude to establish minimum 
standards for any work to be done in inland wetlands. To some extent, 
however, the department's power under Section 40A to pre-empt munici-
pal jurisdiction over wetlands strikes at the fundamental transfer of 
authority apparently achieved by Section 40. 
§21.12. Coastal marine resources. Chapter 789 of the Acts of 1972 
effects several changes in the provisions of G.L., c. 130 relative to pollu-
tion of coastal waters. The restrictions on discharges likely to harm 
marine resources, formerly found in Section 22, are now consolidated 
into a new and expanded Section 23. Section 23 now provides increased 
penalties for unauthorized discharges into coastal waters "which directly 
or indirectly materially injure fish, fishspawn or seed therein." The taking 
of fish by discharge of proscribed substances and the killing or destruc-
tion of fish by use of explosives is also made unlawful by Section 23. 
Sections 24 and 27 were also revised by increasing the penalties re-
coverable by the commonwealth, municipalities and private citizens 
against persons damaging shellfish or other marine resources. Other pro-
visions of Chapter 789 exempt from statutory prohibitions the discharge 
of heated eflluent authorized under either a federal or state permit 
program.l 
§21.13. Other developments. Chapter 219 of the Acts of 1972 
clarified a potentially-troublesome aspect of G.L., c. 214, §lOA,l the so-
6 Pursuant to G.L., c. 130, §l05, the department is empowered to issue orders 
similarly regulating work performance standards in coastal wetlands. 
§21.12. 1 See §21.7, supra. 
§21.13. 1 Inserted by Acts of 1971, c. 732, §l; reviewed in 1971 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §§S.2-S.5. 
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called "Private Right of Action" statute, by inserting therein a definition 
of the term "Person:" 
As used in this section "persons" shall mean any individual, asso-
ciation, partnership, corporation, company, business organization, 
trust, estate, the commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof, 
any administrative agency, public or quasi-public corporation or 
body, or any other legal entity or its legal representatives, agents or 
assigns. 
The amendment is clearly intended to obviate any definitional questions 
that may arise with respect to who may be properly identified as peti-
tioners or respondents in a private suit brought to prevent damage to the 
environment. 
Chapter 707 of the Acts of 1972 clarifies existing provisions granting 
real property tax exemptions2 and corporate income tax deductions3 for 
certain air and water pollution abatement facilities.4o 
Chapter 775 of the Acts of 1972 provides municipalities with pro-
cedures for financing pollution control facilities similar to that provided 
for industrial development facilities.5 
2 G.L., c. 59, §5, c1. forty-fourth. 
3 G.L., c. 63, §38D. 
4 Compare INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §169. 
5 Amending G.L., c. 40D by inserting in § 1 thereof clause O~ and by adding 
§22. 
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